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A bstract
This thesis studies the relationship between technology and industrial 
structure in the context of a growing market economy.
Chapters 2  and 5 develop some general equilibrium models which permit a 
study of the relationship between quality competition, market structure and 
growth. Both market structure and the rate of growth are determined en­
dogenously as functions of underlying parameters describing the pattern of 
technology and tastes, and the institutional environment. It is argued that 
quality competition constitutes an economic mechanism of primary impor­
tance, which provides essential incentives for innovation at the industry level, 
while also contributing to aggregate technological progress by way of R&D 
spillover effects. A related theme of the thesis is that constraints on quality 
competition are detrimental to growth.
Chapter 3 presents a theoretical model which explains certain statisti­
cal regularities regarding cohort survival patterns, the persistence of firm 
turnover, and the appearance of shakeouts during an industry life cycle. By 
treating the market as comprising a number of strategically independent sub- 
markets, this analysis separates the strategic interaction effects which occur 
at the submarket level, from the independence effects which operate across 
submarkets.
Chapter 4 studies competition between two cohorts of radically different 
but substitutable technologies. By analyzing the entry of new-technology- 
based firms, the exit of incumbents and subsequent quality competition, this 
chapter explores the impact of a radical innovation on market structure and 
on the turnover of firms. Two critical levels of the parameter which measures 
the efficiency of the new technology are identified: the first must be attained 
for ‘creative destruction’ to take place, while the second must be attained for 
this ‘creative destruction’ process to take a ‘drastic’ form which involves the 
complete replacement of currently active firms by a wave of new entrants.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is concerned with the way in which imperfectly competitive markets 
guide the allocation of resources toward innovation, and with analyzing how the 
structure of each industry, over its life cycle, develops in tandem with the process 
of economy wide growth.
One central theme that runs through the thesis relates to the joint determination 
of market structure and innovative efforts by firms. This theme emerges clearly in 
the context of quality competition among firms. It is argued that quality competition 
is a primary economic mechanism that provides essential incentives for innovation at 
the industry level. In Chapters 2 and 5, it is further argued that quality competition 
also contributes to aggregate technological progress through R&D spillover effects. 
Chapters 2  and 3 in particular looks at how the roles of institutions, particularly 
financial institutions, shape the market environments in which quality competition 
occurs. The dynamic general equilibrium framework developed in the Chapters 
2 and 5 allows us to draw implications for economic growth, the determinants of 
which are traced to underlying parameters describing the technology of the industries 
and institutional environment within which it works. A further theme explored by 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 addresses the pattern of, and economic forces underpinning, 
industry life cycles.
In the existing R&D-based growth literature (Romer 1990, Grossman and Help- 
man 1992, Aghion and Howitt 1992), monopoly rents are treated as the driving force 
of innovation and the determinants of rents and R&D efforts are usually traced to 
some exogenous market structure. Therefore the chain of causation runs from mar­
ket structure through the ‘rent pull’ to R&D and growth. This is in contrast with 
the recent literature in the Industrial Organization which aims to link market struc­
ture and R&D intensity. This literature has developed at some length the view that 
market structure and R&D intensity should be seen as jointly determined within 
an equilibrium system (Phillips (1971), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Sutton (1998, 
Chapter 1 )), and it has identified a  general economic mechanism, the escalation 
mechanism (Sutton, 1998), which jointly determines R&D intensity and market 
structure. The macro-economic implications of this mechanism have not, however, 
been explored in the literature to date.
In Chapter 2 I develop a growth model in which I explore this topic. The 
basic idea in Chapter 2 is that “quality competition” plus “R&D spillover effects” 
constitute a growth engine distinct from the “rent-pull growth mechanism” that has 
been the focus of attention in the recent ‘endogenous growth’ literature. We look 
at R&D activities which are driven by quality competition between rival firms, (as 
opposed to a ‘patent race’, which leads to the “winner-takes-all” scenario.) The term 
‘quality competition’, in this thesis, means rivalry in vertical product differentiation 
or cost-reducing process innovation, (for the equivalence of these two forms of rivalry, 
see Sutton (1998), pp24-25 and Appendix 15.1.) ‘Quality’ is a special good, which 
has nonrival and partially excludible features. While firms compete in ‘quality’ the 
total benefits created by their R&D efforts go beyond their own industries, due to 
‘spillover effects’, and these spillovers enhance the degree to which industrial R&D 
contributes to the aggregate technological progress.
Based on the above idea, Chapter 2 first develops a basic growth model, which 
extends the quality competition model developed by Sutton (1998), adopting the 
framework originally used by Romer (1990). This model demonstrates the working
of a  “competition-push” engine of growth. The stage-game setting embedded in this 
model then allows us to investigate how some underlying institutional factors can 
affect both market structure and the rate of growth, through affecting the market 
environment for quality competition. Against the benchmark set by the basic model, 
we parameterize, in one extension, the institutional barriers to entry; in another, the 
factors that restrict quality competition, e.g., credit constraints on R&D investment 
due to imperfection in capital markets. The conclusion is that the role of monopoly 
rents should not be over-stated, and that constraints on quality competition, e.g., 
credit constraints, are bad for growth.
Over the past decade the study of industry life-cycles in the growth-of-firms liter­
ature has devoted most of its attention to characterizing and explaining the ‘shake­
ou t’ process (Klepper (1990), Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), Klepper (1996, 
1999)), i.e., the statistical regularity whereby the number of producers tends first 
to rise to a peak and later to fall to some lower level in many industries. Re­
cent empirical findings by Horvath et al. (1997) and Klepper (1999) shed fight on 
two other statistical regularities regarding industry life-cycles: (1 ) the ‘turbulence’ 
(firm turnover), i.e., a statistical regularity whereby the entry-exit process persists 
throughout an industry life-cycle and the observation that the gross entry rate and 
the gross exit rate are positively correlated across industries; and (2 ) the cohort 
survival pattern, i.e., all entry cohorts share a qualitatively similar survival pat­
tern, which displays a significantly higher exit hazard rate at an early age than at 
subsequent ages.
When the ‘turbulence’ and the cohort survival pattern are examined jointly, a 
surprising pattern appears. As first noted by Horvath et al. (1997), despite the 
fluctuation in entry rates, the timing of exits for different cohorts of entrants is re­
markably similar over time: the exit hazard rate peaks at a very early age of every 
cohort’s fife and drops dramatically to low levels at subsequent ages. In this sense, 
a typical industry life-cycle can be roughly re-described as follows: a miniature 
shakeout (i.e., an excess entry followed by dramatic early-age exit then followed by
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gradual subsequent exits) happens in the life of each cohort of entrants in a similar 
way throughout the whole industry life-cycle, and the ‘shakeout’ originally described 
by Klepper is an aggregation of these overlapping-cohort miniature shakeouts, to­
gether with the fact that the early-stage and late-stage cohorts have small numbers 
of entrants and the interim cohorts have large numbers of entrants.
Chapter 3 presents a theoretical model which explains these regularities and the 
links between them. Based on the insight described by Sutton (1997a 1997b, 1998), 
I begin the analysis by treating the market as comprising a number of strategically 
independent submarkets, so that I can separate the strategic interaction effect at 
the submarket level and the independence effects which operate across these inde­
pendent submarkets at the aggregate level. This chapter then proposes an unusual 
but plausible extension of the game-theoretic quality competition literature, with 
an emphasis on independent submarkets, to explain these aforementioned statistical 
regularities in a typical industry life-cycle. The major scenario to be described is 
as follows: The uncertainty and informational problems surrounding the beginning 
of a  new submarket tend to impose credit constraints upon fixed expenditures by 
producers. This in turn restricts the pressure of quality competition and leads to 
the viability of an excessive number of entrants in the early period of the life of the 
submarket. The miniature shakeout takes place later when the initial credit con­
straints are removed as the initial uncertainty is resolved and quality competition 
escalates, leading to the non-viability of a large fraction of existing producers in 
the submarket. Since an industry usually contains many independent submarkets 
which emerge at different times, the above scenario is repeated over time, so we ob­
serve continuing ‘firm turnover’ in the industry. When the emergence of submarkets 
slows down, the gross exit of producers will eventually dominate gross entry, and an 
“aggregate shakeout” takes place.
A frequently asked question about a new technology is whether it is commercial- 
izable? One factor that may deny a new technology commercial value is that the 
industry currently operates using an established substitute technology; the new tech­
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nology may make the existing technology obsolete and replace it. Chapter 4 studies 
competition between two cohorts of radically different but substitutable technolo­
gies, and aims to gain some insights on how markets settle such a contest.
A contest between alternative technologies is sometimes represented as compe­
tition between firms advancing along alternative technological trajectories. One 
suitable measure of the prevalence of a technological trajectory is the market share 
captured by the firms who go along that trajectory. The technological contest is 
deeply influenced by the fact that the progress along a trajectory requires fixed out­
lays in R&D, which may be trajectory-specific and therefore involve sunk costs, in 
the sense th a t most of the value is not transferable across trajectories. As a result, 
switching trajectories will not involve a smooth transition for any incumbent firm 
which has committed sunk costs to the old trajectory; an opportunity may emerge 
which allows profitable entry by new entrants who have no vested interests in the 
old technology. We ask: under what circumstances does this happen, and how are 
market shares allocated between incumbents and new entrants at equilibrium?
While the incumbents employing the existent technology have a first mover ad­
vantage, potential new entrants have the advantage of jumping to the more efficient 
new technology. By conducting equilibrium analysis on the entry of new firms, the 
exit of incumbents and subsequent quality competition, I examine the impact of a 
radical innovation on market structure and on the turnover of firms. The analysis 
fully characterizes the conditions for three possible outcomes: either (1 ) the radical 
new technology is blocked by the existent technology, or (2 ) the two technologies co­
exist in the marketplace, or (3) the new technology replaces the existent technology. 
These conditions imply two bounds to the efficiency of the new technology, the first 
of which must be reached for ‘creative destruction’ to take place, and the second of 
which suffices for its effects to be ‘drastic’.
Some of the insight gained in the partial equilibrium analysis of Chapter 5 carries 
on to the general equilibrium analysis of Chapter 5, where I study the role of qual­
ity competition in endogenous technological progress with cohort replacement. In
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contrast to the Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ type models in the R&D-based 
growth literature (Grossman and Helpman 1992, Aghion and Howitt 1992), which 
identify aggregate technological progress as a sequence of monopolizable achieve­
ments along a ‘quality ladder’, the present analysis relates the technological co­
hort replacement and the associated firm turnover in an industry with some radical 
change in R&D technology, and the new round of quality competition induced by this 
change. We model the radical change in R&D technology as emerging ‘exogenously’, 
i.e., outside the industry to which it is applied, but this process is still endogenous 
from an economy-wide point of view, while the pace of technological change depends 
on the aggregate spillover effects from the R&D efforts in all industries.
One insight arising in the Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ models is that the 
prospect of future creative destruction has a  negative impact on the effort put into 
the current generation of technology. This remains true in the present study, though 
an additional insight emerges: a cohort of established technologies can enjoy a period 
of immunity when is creative-destruction-free. This scenario emerges as a result of a 
finding in Chapter 4, that stronger (but not ‘sufficiently stronger’) new technologies 
may be blocked by established technologies; therefore before ‘sufficiently stronger’ 
new technologies emerge, (and this takes time), established technologies axe immune 
to ‘creative-destruction’.
Creative destruction and firm turnover, in the setting of Chapter 5, emerge as 
particular outcomes of the more fundamental economic force of quality competition 
in association with radical technological changes. This strengthens the central claim 
of Chapter 2 , that quality competition provides an essential incentive for innovation 
at industry level and, through R&D spillover effects, it also underlies aggregate 
technical progress. The present analysis shows that this mechanism is very robust, 
in tha t it does not rely on whether the aggregate technological progress proceeds 
through variety expansions a la Romer (1990) (as assumed in Chapter 2) or through 
cohort replacements a la Aghion-Howitt (1992). This also echoes another claim 
made in Chapter 2: that constraints on quality consumption reduce R&D intensity
13
and lower the rate of growth.
In a short concluding chapter, an overall view of technology and growth is set 
out, which integrates some of the ideas of Chapters 2-5, and places them in a broader 
context.
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Chapter 2
Quality C om petition, M arket 
Structure and Endogenous Growth
2.1 Introduction
One important theme of the recent endogenous growth literature relates to the 
connection between market structure (concentration) and the rate of growth (See for 
example Aghion and Howitt (1998, Chapter 7)). Discussions of this connection have 
been conducted in settings where concentration is taken as an exogenous variable, so 
th a t the “chain of causation” runs from concentration to growth. This mirrors an old 
debate in the related I.O. literature which aimed to relate concentration to the rate 
of innovation (or R&D intensity). That early debate was marked by the difference 
of views regarding the “direction of causality” , some writers seeing the direction 
as running from concentration to R&D intensity, others seeing R&D intensity as 
affecting concentration. This debate had been resolved in the I.O. literature by 
1980, by which time it being widely accepted that concentration and R&D intensity 
should be seen as jointly determined within an equilibrium system. (Phillips (1971), 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Sutton (1998, Chapter 1 )).
In this chapter I re-examine the more complex relationship between concentra­
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tion and the rate of growth from the same standpoint. In the model developed in 
the chapter, we trace the determinants of market concentration and growth to prim­
itive parameters describing the technologies (notably, a parameter that captures the 
“effectiveness of R&D”). This framework allows a re-explanation of the connection 
between such parameters, and the level of concentration and the rate of growth.
At the level of this analysis lie two economic mechanisms:
•  a ‘rent pull’ mechanism of a familiar kind, reminiscent of the “Schumpeterian” 
argument, by which monopolist rent offers an incentive to innovate.
•  a ‘competition effect’, where the push of competition by rivals creates an in­
centive to innovate.
It is the interplay of the two mechanisms which is central to what follows.
The novel feature of this analysis, relating to the existing models in the R&D- 
based growth literature, is that it builds upon the ‘quality competition’ models1 
of the related I.O. literature (See for example Sutton (1991, 1998), Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1980, section II)). In contrast to “patent race”2, or “quality ladder” 3 models, 
these models allow equilibrium outcomes in which several rival firms simultaneously 
offer substitutable ‘quality goods’ or compete in a homogeneous good market via 
cost-reducing process innovations4. Thus we can have a range of market structures
1In this paper the term ‘quality competition’ is used in a broad sense, as to include both 
vertical product differentiation and cost-reducing process innovation, emphasizing the contrast
between ‘innovation as a device of competition’ and pure price competition.
2 See for example Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980, section IV). For a comprehensive survey of the
related literature, see Reinganum (1989).
3See for example Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).
4 The possibility of coexistence of directly competing firms is neither ruled out by the possibility
of “natural monopoly” nor ruled out by patent protection. Related to the former point, Dasgupta 
and Stiglitz (1980) and Sutton (1991, 1998) show that, with ‘quality choice’, an equilibrium outcome 
supporting multiple firms is feasible. Related to the latter point, Levin et al. (1987), provided 
empirical evidence, suggesting that the effectiveness of patents to prevent competition is, in general, 
very limited.
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that run from monopoly through to a ‘fragmented’ (competitive) structure.
Once we are exposed to how some underlying parameters affect both market 
structure and the rate of growth through affecting the game environment, we can 
distinguish the natural tendency of market competition and the outcomes marked 
by the intervention of some institutional variables. Examples of intervention of 
such kind are that “monopolist rent” can be affected by the underlying parameter 
regarding institutional barriers to entry5, tha t R&D intensity can be dependent on 
the parameter which describes the imperfection of the capital market e.g., credit 
constraint on R&D investment.
2.2 The Basic Model: U nderstanding ‘C om petition- 
P ush’
2.2.1 The Setup
Tw o sectors
The model represents an economy which consists of two sectors: a final good sec­
tor and an intermediate good sector with multiple industries producing different 
varieties. For convenience, in what follows, the term ‘industry’ is reserved for an 
industry in the intermediate good sector. The final good can be used in consump­
tion and can also be used as input to produce intermediate goods. The variety of 
intermediate goods can grow as a result of aggregate technological progress. In the 
final good sector there are constant returns to scale and perfect competition. In 
each industry firms compete in ‘quality’ as well as in price. Due to the non-rival 
and excludable features of ‘quality’ and the consequent non-convexity, the firms are 
not price takers and the market structure is endogenous.
°By ‘institutional barriers to entry’, we mean measures which affect the effectiveness of patents 
as means to exclude competition, or the lack or ineffectiveness of antitrust law and policy.
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Industry Level Technology, Non-rival and Excludable ‘qualities’
The technology in an industry can be captured by an endogenous cost structure. The 
variable cost is all capital cost of final good and has constant returns to scale. The 
‘quality’ represents either consumers’ ‘perceived quality’ measure by their willingness 
to pay, or productivity level. Mathematically these are isomorphous, and both can 
be measured by the amount of effective units produced by unit input of final good. 
So in the rest of chapter, quality and productivity are regarded as interchangeable 
terms. Quality can be improved by R&D which requires a fixed cost. The R&D 
cost is all the cost of hiring R&D personnel, and is a convex increasing function of 
quality index. An intermediate good producer can trade off between R&D cost and 
variable cost. There are overall increasing returns to scale due to the fact that the 
quality is non-rival, and can be applied to  all units of output with zero marginal 
cost. The quality is excludable through exclusion devices such as patent or secrecy, 
so it is only accessible by the firm which invests in it.
A ggregate Level Technology and Externalities
The emergence of new varieties of intermediated goods and therefore new markets 
in each period, A, is a function of innovative efforts made by firms in industries, 
measured by L 2 , and the spillover from knowledge embedded in existing intermedi­
ated goods, A, i.e., A = 8 L 2 A. The spillover from A to A has been well recognized 
by the R&D-based growth literature. The R&D spillover effects6 from quality cre­
ation by industries to aggregate growth in knowledge need a few more comments. 
In this model, the R&D personnel (scientists and engineers) L 2 are hired by firms in 
industries to create qualities. In doing so, they also contribute to generic progress in 
knowledge and generate prototype designs of new varieties of intermediated goods 
as by-products. So this kind of spillover is flowing from one type of innovation,
6The empirical evidence on the R&D spillover effects, as surveyed by Nadiri (1993), suggests 
that they are sizable, and may be even larger than the effects of own R&D at industry level.
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i.e., quality improvement, towards another type of innovation, i.e., new prototype 
creation. The emergence of the prototype design of a new variety predicts a new 
emerging market which can soon be entered and competed in.
3-stage Game in Each Industry
Whenever a new industry emerges, a three-stage game is played in the emerging in­
dustry. In the first stage, potential entrants simultaneously choose whether to enter 
the new industry. In the second stage, those firms which have entered the market 
choose their ‘quality’ levels (u;), which will be achieved by R&D and incurring costs 
of hiring R&D personnel. In the third stage, firms with their achieved ‘quality’ level 
compete in quantity in a Cournot manner7.
C onsum ption
There are constant L  identical consumers who five infinitely and each has one unit 
of labor per period. The labor can be supplied either as simple labor used in final 
good sector, or innovative labor used in industries to do R&D. Each consumer has 
a discounted, constant elasticity preference:
where c is consumption of final good, p is time preference and e is the constant 
relative risk averse coefficient. The Euler equation for intertemporal optimization 
for given interest rate r is that - =
7The form of price competition throughout this thesis is Cournot quantity competition. Tougher 
price competition as captured by a Bertrand price competition, or softer price competition which 
may involve some form of collusion are beyond the scope of this thesis.
e ptdt for e > 0
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Final G ood Sector
The final good can be treated as the numeraire. Its production function is
Y  = L \ ~ 7  J  ( j ]  UjjXj^j di,
where Y  is the total output of final good, L\ is labor input, is the input of 
the intermediate good provided by firm j  in industry i, whose corresponding firm- 
specific ‘quality index’ is Uij, Ni is the number of firms in industry i, and A  is the 
number of intermediate good industries, 0  <  7  < 1 .
To simplify the formulation, we define the quality-adjusted quantity as:
Xij =  U{j Xij,
and define the ‘quality-adjusted price’ of each unit of quality-adjusted quantity as:
*  ■ f t -
Since every unit of quality-adjusted quantity in industry i is homogeneous, the 
following ‘one price principle’ (or non-arbitrage condition) must apply:
Pij =Pi for j  = 1 , 2 , ••• , N i,i = 1,2, ••• , A
After the transformation, the original production function can be replaced by:
Y  = - I f  [  x jd i, (2 .1 )
Jo
where Xi = x UijXij. Now can be re-interpreted as a ‘productivity
index’ measured in units of quality-adjusted quantity. Mathematically this new 
formulation is isomorphous to the one which may describe the setting where in each
industry firms produce a homogeneous good with firm-specific productivity.
There is perfect competition in the final good market due to constant returns 
to scale, so equating the marginal product of labor and the wage rate gives us the 
inverse labor demand function
„ - < 1 7 >1'.  (2 .2 )
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Similarly by equating the marginal product of input z and its price, we have the 
inverse demand function for intermediate good z,
Pi = 7^1" W 1- (2.3)
2.2.2 The Game o f Quality C om petition w ith Free Entry
In each emerging industry a 3-stage game is played. The solution concept adopted in 
this chapter is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and it can be solved by backward 
induction. The third stage subgame is a Cournot game of quantity competition, a 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists and is unique for a given set of quality levels of all 
firms and the demand condition of the economy. The subgame Nash equilibrium 
determines for each firm a reduced-form profit function as follows
jV - _ l+ jX  /  _  t v - i  +  t X m
E AT II yvAT y± J ’j =  1 Uj J  \  2-j j=z 1 u- /
market share mark-up ratio
where S  =  L \  ( ) , Ui is the quality level of firm of z, zz_i is a (N  — 1)-
\ ^ = i  “i /
tuple of quality levels of other firm except firm z, for z =  1,2 , • • • , N \ N  is the number
of firms in the industry and L \  is the amount of labor employed in the final sector.
Interested readers can find the derivation of this reduced-form profit function8
in Appendix A. Its key feature is that a firm’s profit increases with its relative
quality level against its rivals’, i.e., Y ^= \ ^i - This function tells how the strategic
environment responds to vertical differentiations of firms. It captures the Darwinian
selection pressure embedded in the environment constituted by customers and rivals.
This environment provides firms with incentives to outperform their rivals in R&D
and quality. When they vie in quality, each of them has to bear the burden of R&D
8This formulation is extended from the one developed in Appendix 15.1 of Sutton (1998). It 
allows a general treatment of T € [0,1) while the Sutton (1998) formulation only deals with a 
special case, equivalent to: 7  =  0 .
7Ti (Ui | U - i )  =
market size
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cost, which is a function of quality level as shown below:
F ( Ui-w ,A ) = w ^ u f ,  (**)
where (/? > 1) is the input of R&D personnel to generate quality level ui: w 
is the market wage rate and fi is a constant. The R&D cost is therefore all labor 
cost. It is worth emphasizing that the increase in A, i.e., the aggregate level stock of 
knowledge, can shift the fixed (R&D) cost curve downward as shown in Figure 2.1. 
The intuition is that knowledge spillover from aggregate technical progress enhances 
the efficiency of R&D by each new firm. This positive trend may be offset by the 
negative trend caused by an increase in wage rate, also shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Fixed (R&D) cost function
Therefore each firm’s objective in the second stage subgame is to maximize its 
net profit, in the present value sense, by choosing its own quality level given others’ 
quality levels,
max
TV -1 +  7
. (2-4)r (l — 7 ) I y Nv y \  Uj
where r  is the interest rate. If we take the reduced form profit function and the R&D 
cost function as given, then the game is in essence a game of quality competition 
with free entry.
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2.3 Equilibrium
2.3.1 Market Structure and R& D in Each Industry
Equilibrium analysis is focused on a symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, 
where each firm equates the marginal benefit of increasing quality and the marginal 
R&D cost. The implied best-reply function for each firm in a symmetric outcome is 
that
F  =  r ; H i V *  +  2 (  } N *  ) ’ ( 5)
where S  =  7 T3 ?Li ( N~ ^ u) 1-7  is the industry’s total revenue per period.
It is assumed that any intermediate good industry has free-entry. This results 
in the following zero-profit condition, which equates the R&D cost of the firm ^ u& 
and the present value of profit flows ,
F  = ^j-vP  =  ^ . A r N 2 (2.6)
NFr/S
Zero-profit
Best-reply
3.52.5
Figure 2.2: Market structure and industry R&D intensity
Figure 2.2 presents the above best-reply condition and zero-profit condition as 
two curves. The vertical axis is the industry R&D intensity and the horizontal axis
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is the number of firms in each industry. The graph shows that the Best-reply curve 
is upward sloping and the zero profit curve is downward slopping and they cross 
once so that it implies that a unique class of symmetric Nash equilibria exist, where 
R&D level and market structure are simultaneously determined. This suggests that 
there is a two-way causality between market concentration and R&D intensity. This 
result defies the view which portrays a simple causal relationship between the two 
variables. The graph also shows that when the parameter j3 decreases, it shifts the 
Best-reply curve upward therefore increases both market concentration 1 /N  and 
industry R&D intensity9 (from a  to b). The intuition for this result is as follows. A 
lower f3 means a higher degree of overall increasing returns to scale at firm level10. 
The market equilibrium finds a way to exploit this by having more concentrated 
market structure in each intermediate good industry. Sutton (1998) dubs this kind 
of economic mechanism as an ‘escalation mechanism’. These findings are formally 
stated in the following
P ro p o s itio n  1 11 The market structure and the R&D intensity of each intermediate
9 For a casual observer who could not see the underlying shift in /?, there would be a temptation 
for him to claim that concentration causes high R&D intensity. But for a careful econometrician 
who would manage to control j3, such a postulated positive causal relation could be dismissed. This 
scenario briefly reflects the evidence in the empirical literature. According to a comprehensive 
survey by Cohen and Levin (1989) on the empirical evidence, most studies on the relationship 
between market concentration and R&D intensity report a positive relation, though some find a 
negative one, and others argue for a non-monotonic relationship, e.g., Scherer (1967) suggested 
a non-linear, ‘inverted U ’ relationship between the two variables. Furthermore, Scott (1984) and 
Levin et al. (1985) provide evidence that when some industry-specific effects are controlled for, 
concentration is found to contribute very little to the explanation of the variance in R&D intensity, 
and its effect becomes statistically less significant or even insignificant.
10The overall production function of each intermediate good producer is Xi — u iy i  =  ^ y i ,
which is homogeneous of degree 1 +  ^ in (L,2 i , y i ) .  To see this in detail, note that L<ii is the input
of innovative labor to achieve u i , which is the productivity level, L>2 i — Ui =  ,
and y i is the final good used as input to produce the intermediate good.
11 The results here are consistent with those found in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) and Sutton
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good industry are simultaneously determined in the symmetric equilibrium. The 
equilibrium number of firms in each industry is N f  = n (0 , 7 ) =  ™0 +V no~2i 2  
where n 0 =  -f 1 . Furthermore N f  is increasing in (3.
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.3.2 Balanced Growth Equilibrium
Following the conventional strategy to characterize a dynamic general equilibrium 
model, the balanced growth equilibrium is considered, where y  = c = :J  = w = 9  is 
satisfied and Iq , L 2 are constant over time. Immediate implications of these include 
that g = -c — that g =  ^  =  6 L 2 and that ^  and j  are constant over time. A 
further implication is that the demand condition: p = and the R&D cost
function: F  (u; w, A) = w ^ u 13, therefore the 3-stage game played in each industry 
are identical over time. Then it is reasonable to focus attention only on symmetric 
outcomes.
In the symmetric balanced growth equilibrium, the total revenue in each industry 
per period is identically
S  = px = (2.7)
where 7  is the cost share of all intermediate goods in the final good sector. Therefore 
7 Y  is the total revenue of all industries per period and ^  is the total revenue of 
each industry. Given ^  is constant, S  should also be constant.
The symmetric balanced growth equilibrium also implies that is identical for 
all industries. Then the demand for innovative labor L2 can be calculated as follows,
L2 =  A N s ^ u P ,  (2.8)
(1991). The setup of the game in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) is a simultaneous game, unlike the 
sequential game setting in this chapter. Sutton (1991) differs slightly in that 7  is fixed to 0. With 
a general 7  in the current setting, it is found that N f  is decreasing in 7 .
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where A  is number of emerging industries per period, N f  is the number of firms in 
each industry and is the demand for innovative labor by each new firm. This 
condition combined with the aggregate growth equation
A  = 8 L 2 A. (2.9)
pins down the quality level in each industry as follows
vP = - f — . (2.10)
f iNf 6
To close the model, it remains to add the labor market clearing condition L =
L i + L 2. Given the zero-profit condition ^JfuP = 7^ ? ,  a few manipulations with
eq. (2 .2 ), (2 .1 0 ) and (2.7) to eliminate w, vP, S  put in place the final brick of the 
model as
^  = 5 -  ( 2 - n )
The system is finally boiled down to four equations: <
L  — L\ +  L 2
t _  zUl
1 6  , which
£* =  §
9 =  I7£
imply12 the balanced growth rate:
=  j S L - g N ,
7  +  N f e v J
The expression of the growth rate has the following features captured by
Proposition  2 The growth rate g is decreasing in the equilibrium number of firms 
in each industry, N f ,  and it is decreasing in {3.
P ro o f =  _  -yjp+eSL) Q Q iv e n  0 <  0 ■-Troon dNf (7+7v/e) vjiven Qf3 > u, Q(3 dNf Qf3 u. ■
The results should be interpreted with Diagram 1 in mind, knowing the causal 
relationship between variables. We see in eq. (2.12) that growth rate is linked with
12 Other results are Li — TVt —e6h+£-.  r  — a  sSL+p r _  a 6L - p N f u tner results are — i v j  6(a+Nf£) > r  ~  a a+ N f e > — 6(a+Nf e) ■
26
market structure (fragmentation, measured by N f ,  is negatively correlated with g).  
But it would be a misunderstanding if one inferred that growth could be enhanced 
by making industrial structures more concentrated, because the market structure is 
not an exogenous variable which can be controlled in the case of free entry. The 
deep reason for this correlation to exist is tha t market structure (n) and R&D effort 
(F) are jointly determined in equilibrium, both dependent on the industry level 
technological parameter /3. Through the causal linkage between R&D and growth, 
(3 also affects g. Figure 2.3 shows that because (3 simultaneously has a positive effect 
on n  and a  negative effect on g, n  and g must be negatively correlated, though not 
causally.
The demonstrated feasibility of positive rate of R&D-based growth in the case 
of free entry is very informative. It shows tha t even without positive net profit 
(rent), under certain micro-level and macro-level technological conditions, quality 
competition still provides a ‘competition-push’ engine of growth which works.
b '  
Diagram 1. The causal relationship between /3, n  and g
2.3.3 Discussion
Free C om petition  w ithout Price-taking
When quality competition prevails and non-convexity results from the non-rival 
feature of ‘quality’, the endogenous R&D cost will form a natural barrier to en­
try. Consequently, though without any regulation on entry, profitability will dictate 
free but limited entry. In this environment price-taking behavior cannot be sus­
tained, but the market should nevertheless be regarded very competitive due to
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n, gxlOO
gxlOO
Figure 2.3: (3 jointly determines n  and g
free entry. In this sense, a competitive market without perfect (price) competition 
is conceivable and non-convexity is compatible with (quality-)competitive markets. 
By characterizing the quality-based increasing returns to scale and the natural rule 
of market competition, this quality competition model stands in between the two 
extreme cases most studied in the economic literature, i.e., monopoly and perfect 
competition, presenting a picture of natural oligopolies. It suggests that the essence 
of a free market system does not necessarily lie in price-taking behavior, rather the 
‘competition-push’ provides sufficient Darwinian pressure which contributes to the 
evolution of technologies.
Variety Expansion or Cohort Replacem ent
The above analysis of quality competition-based growth is presented in the context 
of a variety-expansion economy. It is assumed tha t the emergence of new grounds of 
quality competition relies on the expansion of varieties in a Romer (1990) manner. 
The major findings from the analysis, however, are more general than this particular 
setting. In Chapter 5, which presents a different version of the quality competition- 
based growth model, the same key results have been achieved from the context 
of a cohort-replacement economy. There the emergence of new grounds of quality 
competition is assumed to follow the replacement of earlier cohorts of technologies
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by successive ones in a manner akin to the Aghion-Howitt (1992) specification of 
‘creative destruction’. The departure from the Aghion-Howitt (1992) model is that 
the model in Chapter 5 allows multiple firms of the same cohort to compete in 
quality within each single market.
Given that variety expansion and cohort replacement are the two major modes of 
fundamental innovations, showing that quality competition-pushed innovation can 
complement either variety-expansion or cohort-replacement in generating endoge­
nous growth assures the robustness of the analysis.
2.4 The Interplay o f ‘Com petition-push’ and ‘Rent- 
pull’
2.4.1 A  Game o f Quality Com petition w ith  Restricted En­
try
Having seen how quality competition jointly determines market structure and R&D 
intensity in the setting of the basic model, we proceed in the next step to analyze 
the interplay of the ‘competition-push’ and the ‘rent-pull’ familiar in the existing of 
R&D-based growth models. While free entry dries rents up, institutional barriers to 
entry tend to generate positive rents. In this section it is assumed that institutional 
barriers to entry impose a constraint on the number of potential entrants. If the 
number of potential entrants is smaller than N f  i.e., the number of firms determined 
in the free-entry equilibrium, then this constraint is binding and the zero-profit 
condition (2.6) does not hold. The actual number of firms in each industry, N , 
satisfies the condition 1 <  N  < N f .  This modifies the game played in each industry 
to a ‘game of quality competition with restricted entry’. The equilibrium of the 
changed game then is characterized by the restricted N ,  which has deviated from 
N f ,  and the best reply condition (2.5).
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R en ts  vs. R & D  C osts
Figure 2.4 shows that when N  deviates from N f  (N  < N f )  the new equilibrium 
is no longer at point a, which is the cross of the zero-profit curve and Best-reply 
curve. Instead, it shifts to point b  (we will discuss the reason later) and the extra 
market power generates positive net profits, i.e., rents, residual after R&D costs are 
covered.
NFr/S
Zero-profit
Rents
Best-reply
R&D costs
4 N2.51.5 2 3 3.5
Figure 2.4: Market structure and spilt of profit 
The present value of the rents therefore is a function of /3,7 , N,  S  and r as follows,
V (l3 ,'r ,N ,S ,r )  = ^ ^ - - F ,  (2.13)
where 7 ^ ?  is the present value of future profits flows and
F = r +  2 (N  ~  *) N~n ^ ) is the R&D cost by e(l- (2-5)-
To simplify discussion, rent and R&D cost can be denominated by the present 
value of industry total revenue S / r . Define II (/?, 7 , N )  =  vi /3’'rs^ S'rl = .(i-7 )ffw-7 -^C^-i)(w-i+7)
and F0 (3 ,7 , N )  =  ^  j  ( ^ 3  +  2 ( N  -  1) ■iV~13+1) . It is easy to see that II (/?, 7 , N )  >
0 for N  < N f  and that II (/?, 7 , N )  = 0 for N  = N f .
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M arket Structure, Profitability and Split o f Profits
Figure 2.4 also shows that when 1 < N  < N f ,  increasing extra market power 
(decreasing N )  will increase the share of rents and decrease the share of R&D costs.
The intuition is that when the restriction on free entry is tightened the split of 
profits will shift in favor of rents against R&D costs. This result is formally stated 
by the following
Proposition  3 I f  1 < N  < N f t h e n  B(Nm j , N ) + NFo) <  0> f f l M  <  0  a n d
dN  W'
Proof. See appendix A.
2.4.2 Com plem entarity betw een 6C om petition-Push’ and ‘Rent- 
P u ll’
The aggregate growth equation (2.9) used in the basic model is too simple to capture 
the familiar rent-pull engine of growth. We extend it as follows:
A = 6 min —3- ^ A, for 0  <  9 <  1 ,
where L 2 is the hired R&D personnel, L3 is the labor of entrepreneurs, involved in 
searching, creating and preempting new grounds of quality competition, providing 
leadership and gaining extra market power. In the context of a variety expansion 
economy, entrepreneurial efforts may be needed for the creation of new industries.
The entrepreneurs are the founders of industrial firms and their efforts are compen­
sated by the residual incomes of the firms, i.e., the rents, instead of wages. The 
parameter 6  determines to what extent L 2 or L3 is a scarce resource for the pur­
pose of economic growth. For example, if 6  = 1 , then the equation is reduced to
A = 6 L 2 A, which implies that L3 is not scarce at all, as in our basic model. On
the other hand, the familiar models of rent-pull usually assume that 6  = 0 , which 
implies that L 2 is not scarce at all, and A = 6 L 3 A. In between these two extreme
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2.14
cases, A  =  A  applies if ^  holds in equilibrium and A  =  Sj^ qA  applies if
^  holds in equilibrium. Given this specific functional form, it is immediately
clear that for a given value of 0 , the growth-maximizing ratio between L2 and L3 is
I?. — 0 
l 3 1-0 *
Due to perfect mobility of labor between L2 and L 3 , each entrepreneur’s income 
should be equal to the income of a hired scientist or engineer in equilibrium. Since 
ZVs total income equals to total R&D costs and L3’s total income equals to total 
rents, the ‘entrepreneurial arbitrage condition’ requires that the ratio between L 2  
and Ls should be equal to the R&D costs-rents ratio, i.e.,
Therefore there exists a growth-maximizing split of profit such that yj* =  
or equivalently, = 0, which imply13 N  = N* =  , where n\ =
(/30+2)(l—7 ) y
Figure 2.5 shows that the growth-maximizing split of gross profit: =  0
as the dashed curve for a given value of 6 . The Best-reply curve between a  and b 
is the actual split of profit. It can be seen in the graph that point e represents the 
unique growth-maximizing market structure. For a point between a  and e, such as 
d, the share of rents is too low for the purpose of growth. On the other hand, for 
a point between b  and e, such as c, the share of rents is too high and the market 
is too concentrated. So two points can be made from the graph: (1 ) both the 
competition-push engine and the rent-pull engine may be needed for the purpose of 
growth. (2 ) more extra market concentration does not always mean a higher rate 
of growth. These points are made even clearer when the balanced growth rate is 
solved explicitly.
13They imply the following quadratic equation N 2 — ^(^ + 2)(1~T') -|- 1  ^TV +  =  0.
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Figure 2.5: Growth-maximizing split of profit
2.4.3 Institutional Barriers to  Entry and Growth
To obtain the closed-form growth function within this extended framework, one can 
refer to the derivations within the basic model, but should note that the zero profit 
condition (eq. (2 .6 ) ) is replaced by the entrepreneurial arbitrage condition (eq. 
(2.15)), that eq. (2.14) replaces eq. (2.9) and tha t the new labor market clearing 
condition is changed to L = L\ 4 - L 2 +  L%.
Then the implied balanced growth rate is
y SN
1 - 7 “ iH ( in  1h ) L ~ p
9  =  ^  L- (2-16)e + N
which, for a given 0, is a single-peaked function of N .  The location of the peak 
is at the previously solved growth-maximizing market structure N*,  which depends 
crucially on parameter 9. The results are summarized by the following
L em m a 4 N* is the growth-maximizing market structure. N* is increasing in 9. 
When 9 = 1, N* = N f .  Furthermore when N  < N*,  > 0; when N  > N*,
M. < 0
d N  u '
P roof. See Appendix A.
Now we have to discuss how the actual market structure N  is jointly determined 
by underlying technological parameters and a parameter measuring the effect of
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institutional barriers to entry. The crucial assumption we make is that the interplay 
of the technological parameters and the institutional barrier parameter is such that,
•  the technological parameters determine a benchmark market structure, such 
as in a free-entry equilibrium ( N f  = n(/3,7 )).
•  the institutional barrier parameter then determines how far the restricted num­
ber of potential entrants can deviate from the benchmark market structure 
determined above.
Denoting the institutional barrier parameter by 0, the interplay of the above two 
effects is captured by that
N  = 0 +  (1 — 0) n ((3, 7 ) , for 0 e  [0,1].
Note that 0 is the weight of a convex combination of the monopolist market structure 
and the free-entry market structure, 0 = and tha t when 0 =  0, N  = N f  (no
deviation); when 0 =  1, N  = 1 (full deviation). Define 0* =  then by Lemma
4 it is straightforward to see
P ro p o sitio n  5 0* is growth-maximizing. 0* is increasing in 9. When 9 = 1 , 
0* — 0. Furthermore when 0 < 0*, g is increasing in 0; when 0 > 0*, g is 
decreasing in 0 .
Results obtained in this section should be interpreted with Diagram 2 in mind, 
being aware of the directions of the “chains of causation” . In this appended setting, 
the influence of the industry level technological parameter (3 feeds into the ‘natu­
ral tendency’ of market structure, captured by the free-entry equilibrium market 
structure n. This natural tendency then interplays with the ‘institutional barriers 
to entry’ parameter 0 to jointly determine the actual market structure TV, the gross 
profits, and the split of the gross profits into R&D costs (Fo) and rents (II). For a 
given (3, (f) is a controllable parameter which determines (TV, Fo, II) jointly. Accord­
ing to another underlying parameter 9, which measures the relative scarcity of hired
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scientists and engineers vs. entrepreneurs, (AT, Fo, II) feed into the determination of 
the rate of growth. So for a fixed (3, the most interesting parameters are 9 and 0, 
and we visualize their influences on the rate of growth g in figure 2 .6 .
The graph shows that when 9 = 1 ,  which describes the case of a single competition- 
push at work, then an institution which guarantees free entry (point a: 6  = 1, (j) — 0 ) 
is growth-maximizing. On the other hand, when 9 = 0, which describes the case 
of a single rent-pull engine at work, unsurprisingly, the institution which generates 
monopolist structure (point b: 9 = 0, </> =  1) is growth maximizing. In between 
the two extreme cases lie three curves which describe cases where the twin engines 
are both at work. Then the relationship between </> and g is non-monotone, or more 
precisely of a “inverted U” shape. As for whether a given (j) is too big (as at point c), 
too small (as at point d) or just right (as at point e) for the purpose of growth, it all 
subtly depends on the parameter 9. When 9 decreases (i.e., the rent-pull becomes
Diagram 2. The causal relationship between f3, n, N  and g
*     mum
Figure 2.6: The relationship between </> and g for given 9
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more important), relevant institutional barriers to entry become more desirable for 
the purpose of growth. However, it is also quite safe to claim that monopoliza­
tion is not in general growth-maximizing, given that 6  should not be too close to 0  
generically. This final point is formally stated by the following
P ro p o sitio n  6  When 9 > > N* > 1, i.e., monopolization is not growth-
maximizing.
P roof. 6  > jg(1T_7) => n i > 2 — ^ 7  => N* > 1. ■
Consider a numerical example: 7  =  1/3, f3 =  5, N f = 3.0611, = 0 .1 . It
is quite reasonable to assume that 6  > 0 .1 , therefore monopolization should not be 
growth-maximizing in this case. The policy implication is stark: to keep the essential 
competition-push engine to work for the purpose of growth, monopolization of broad 
markets should not be encouraged.
2.4.4 Romer (1990) R evisited
Having fully characterized a model of the twin engines of growth, it is then interesting 
to see whether this framework can help to improve our understanding of some of the 
major existing R&D-based growth models, from a different perspective. Taking as 
an example the textbook version14 of Romer (1990) model, two interesting questions 
can be asked:
1. can the result in the Romer model being replicated from this framework by 
taking a limiting case?
2 . if ‘yes’ to the above question, what then can be said about the ‘close neigh­
borhood’ of the Romer model within the scope of this framework?
Indeed the answer to the first question is ‘yes’, as elaborated by the following
14See for example Aghion and Howitt (1998) provides a textbook version of Romer (1990) model.
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Proposition 7 151 /0  =  0, 0 = 1 , / ?  —> oo, then g —> (simplified Romer
result).
Proof. 0 =  0, <j) =  1 => g =  5 => lim^^oo # =  7e+^P • ■
This result suggests that if (1) there is no R&D spillover effects from the post­
entry R&D, (2) the post-entry R&D is also a very ineffective means of competition, 
and (3) the institutional barriers to entry guarantee monopolization, then the out­
come in the Romer (1990) model can be derived from this framework.
In the “close neighborhood” of the Romer (1990) model, i.e., setting 0 =  0 and 
0 = 1 , the closed-form growth rate then is reduced to:
7  8L — p j 28L
9  £  +  7  / ? ( e  +  7 ) ( l - 7 ) ’
which unambiguously increases in (3.
Proposition 8  I f  6  = 0, 0 = 1 ,  J |  > 0 ,  i.e., in the above setting of ‘monopolistic 
competition with (post-entry) quality choice’ the more effective the post-entry R&D 
is, the lower the rate of growth.
The intuition is straightforward: the more effective the post-entry R&D, monop­
olists will be more involved in cross-industry quality competition, which will only 
hurt rents and growth.
This analysis sheds new light on what a  monopolistic competition setting tends to 
imply about the relation between competition and growth. Although in the setting 
of the Romer (1990) model there is no appropriate way16 to relate competition 
and growth, the analysis of a setting in the ‘close neighborhood’ does reveal useful 
information on its ‘logical implication’.
15Note, in a simplified Romer model (see for example Aghion and Howitt (1998, pp35-39) ) the
closed-form growth rate is equivalent to g  — .
16Note that in the simplified Romer (1990) model the parameter 7  which relates to demand
elasticity, is also related to the share of capital in income distribution in the final sector. The
mixed meaning makes it not an appropriate measure of competition.
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2.5 Extending the Model: The Impact o f Credit 
Constraint
The previous section examined how quality competition can be affected by insti­
tutional barriers to entry. This section looks at an extension of the basic model 
by asking how quality competition may be restricted in another possible way, viz. 
through being constrained by credit limits. This line of analysis leads to one pos­
sible explanation of the observed link between financial development and economic 
growth. The idea explored here is that quality competition-induced investment in 
R&D is usually large in absolute terms and takes an illiquid form, an so it requires 
external finance. This results in the capital market playing an important role in 
endogenous growth through the financing of R&D. In the basic model, it has been 
implicitly assumed that the capital market is perfect, so these issues don’t  arise. In 
practice, however, this assumption is very restrictive, and needs to be relaxed.
The reasons why the capital market may not be perfect lie beyond the scope of 
this thesis17. Here we simply explore the consequences that follow if firms cannot 
finance investment up to their preferred levels. The simplest way to capture this 
problem is to assume that there are exogenously imposed credit limits on all firms’ 
R&D expenditures. Since in the symmetric balanced growth equilibrium there is 
a one-to-one mapping between R&D cost F  and quality level w, credit constraints 
impose constraints on quality levels. The analysis can be simplified, therefore, by 
simply assuming that there are exogenously imposed constraints on quality levels. 
Consequently, the unconstrained maximization problem (2.4) is replaced by the
17For example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) attribute the reason why creditors may set credit 
limits to the fact that some debtors cannot credibly commit n o t  to strategically default on debt 
repayments.
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following constrained maximization problem
s  ( ,  N c — 1 +  7 ^ Wfi f,m ax—  - 1 -—T7 ----------—
<h r (1 — 7) y E f= !^  y A
s.t. : u f <  r)uP (2.18)
where vP =  —^  is the unconstrained maximum point in the balanced growth 
equilibrium (See eq. (2.10)) and 77 is the index of credit constraint, 0 < 77 < 1 .
2.5.1 Corner Solutions and Fragmented Market Structure
The definition of 77 implies that when 77 < 1 the unconstrained equilibrium quality 
level is no longer feasible, therefore the credit constraint must be binding and it 
results in the following corner solution to the maximization problem,
( 2 - 1 9 )
where uc is the constrained maximum point for each firm.
Similar to eq. (2.10), in the balanced growth equilibrium each firm’s quality level 
is pinned down by
c iiNcS ’
where N c is the number of firms in each industry. Comparing the above two equa­
tions immediately reveals the relationship between N c and N f  as follows,
Nc = for 0 < T) < 1, (2.20)
which then implies
P ro p o sitio n  9 < 0, i.e., tighter credit constraint leads to more fragmented
market structure.
Figure 2.7 shows that when there is a credit constraint, the Best-reply condition 
no longer holds. Instead of point a, point b  becomes the equilibrium, where the 
industry R&D cost level is lower and the market structure is more fragmented.
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Figure 2.7: Credit constraint and market structure 
2.5.2 Credit Constrained Growth
In this extension of the model, the growth function (2.9) is replaced by
7  S L - p N c 7 6 L ~ p ^
9 = = ( 2 '2 1 )
Simple comparative statics shows that
%  > °> (2-22)
which means
P ro p o sitio n  10 I f  there is a binding credit constraint in the capital market, i.e., 
77 < 1 , then g is increasing in 77, i.e., ceteris paribus, the less credit-constrained 
economy has higher growth rate.
Diagram 3 reveals the causal relationship between variables. For a given (3, the 
binding credit constraint 77 (77 < 1 ) causes a deviation of the actual market structure 
(Nc) from its natural tendency (n) while imposing its influence on R&D expenditures 
(F).  Through the causal relation between R&D and the rate of growth, tighter credit 
constraint (smaller 77) eventually has a negative impact on g, as shown in Figure 
2.8 and eq. (2 .2 2 ). Since tightening credit constraint (decreasing 77) has a negative
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Figure 2.8: 77 jointly determines N c and g
impact on g, and a positive effect on N c: the correlation between Nc and g then 
must be negative.
6  J
Diagram 3. The causal relationship between /?, n, N c and g
These stark results are consistent with the empirical finding that there is a posi­
tive correlation between financial development and growth performance across coun­
tries. (King and Levine, 1993, Rajan and Zingales, 1996). The new insight gained 
from this analysis suggests a new channel through which finance can affect growth. 
This analysis emphasizes tha t finance can affect the competitive pattern. When 
firms are financially constrained in competing in quality, they are forced to compete 
in price in more fragmented markets. But the work of the ‘competition-push’ engine 
relies on quality competition rather than price competition, it therefore slows down. 
So this analysis predicts that a low growth rate is likely to be associated with market 
fragmentation, conditional on there not being institutional barriers to entry. This 
prediction is consistent18 with the evidence provided by Kumar, Rajan and Zingales
18This claim relies on two maintained hypotheses: (1) economic growth rate is positively corre­
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(1999) showing that firm size in external-finance-dependent industries is positively 
correlated with financial development.
Furthermore, although this analysis only focuses on the impact of credit con­
straints on quality competition and growth, the logic of the analysis can well be 
extended to studying the impact of constraints in the human capital market, such 
as employees’ adoption and investment in learning and improving new technologies. 19
2.5.3 A  Poverty Trap
Eq. (2.21) also implies that there is a threshold of 77, below which the sustained 
positive balanced growth rate is impossible, i.e.,
„  ^  p n ( 0 , 7 ) _  „ „  „  /n (V A
n ~  j S L  ^ 9 - 0’ (2’23)
which suggests
P ro p o sitio n  1 1  There exists a lower bound of r), rjlow = , such that i f  77 <
r]iow, then g = 0 , i.e., growth can not be sustained in an economy which has too tight 
credit constraints in capital market. 2 0
The implication is that the competition-push engine of growth cannot function 
properly due to imperfection in the capital market. Severe financial underdevelop­
ment may cause the engine to stop working at all.
It is worth mentioning that the credit constraint discussed above is not necessar­
ily due to unavailability of funds within an economy. It may be mainly due to the
fact that the infrastructure, and institutions in the economy, are incapable of solv­
ing various informational problems or contract enforcement problems. It may be the
lated with financial development, and (2) firm size is positively correlated with market concentra­
tion.
19 Related to this view, Chandler (1990) has already addressed the possibility that institutional
constraints in the human capital market may restrict the exploitation of scale economies.
20Due to irreversibility of innovation, g  is bounded from below by 0 in our model, but zero
growth is possible.
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case that this is a major contributory factor underlying poor economic performance. 
If so, poverty is not primarily driven by a lack of accumulation of physical capital. 
The ultimate cause lies in the idea that the institutions are incapable of supporting 
growth through their failure to allocate capital efficiently.
2.6 Conclusion
Understanding how quality competition jointly determines market structure and 
the rate of growth is the key to understanding why ‘competition-push’ is an essen­
tial engine of growth. The analysis needs to be carried out by beginning with the 
set of underlying parameters that determine both variables jointly. At this level, 
we can re-open the question regarding the relation between market structure and 
growth. It is suggested here that the interplay of the ‘twin engines of growth’, namely 
‘competition-push’ and the more familiar ‘rent-pull’, complicates the link between 
market concentration and the rate of growth, leading to an inverted U shape rela­
tionship. It follows that, the need for ‘rent-pull’ notwithstanding, monopolization 
is, in general, not good for growth.
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Chapter 3 
Submarkets, Shakeouts and  
Industry Life Cycle
3.1 Introduction
In the past decade the study of industry life-cycles in the firm-growth literature 
has devoted most of its attention to characterizing and explaining the process of 
‘shakeout’1, i.e., the statistical regularity according to which the number of producers 
tends to first rise to a peak and later falls to some lower level. This process has been 
observed in a large number of industries. Recent empirical findings by Horvath et al. 
(1997) and Klepper (1999) shed light on two other statistical regularities regarding 
the industry life-cycle: (1 ) ‘turbulence’ (firm turnover), i.e., the statistical regularity 
that the entry-exit process persists throughout an industry life-cycle and gross entry 
and gross exit rates are positively correlated; and (2 ) the cohort survival pattern, 
i.e., all entry cohorts share a qualitatively similar survival pattern, which displays 
a significantly higher exit hazard rate at early age than subsequent ages. These 
patterns may be closely associated with the process of ‘shakeout’. This chapter 
presents a theoretical model which offers an explanation of these regularities, and
1See for example, Klepper (1990), Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), Klepper (1996, 1999).
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of the links between them.
Panel A of Figure 3.1 shows a striking example of ‘shakeout’ and the associated 
pattern of firm turnover (‘turbulence’). Panel B of Figure 1 shows the cohort survival 
pattern. When the ‘turbulence’ and the cohort survival pattern are jointly examined, 
a surprising pattern emerges. As first noted by Horvath et al. (1997), despite the 
fluctuation in entry rates, the timing of exits for different cohorts of entrants is 
remarkably similar over time: the exit hazard rate is peaked at a very early age 
of every cohort’s life and drops dramatically to low levels for subsequent ages2. In 
this sense, a typical industry life-cycle can be roughly re-described as follows: a 
miniature shakeout (i.e., an excess entry followed by dramatic early-age exit then 
followed by gradual subsequent exits) actually happens in the life of each cohort of 
entrants in a similar way throughout the whole industry life-cycle, and the industry 
level shakeout that has been widely observed emerges as an aggregation of these 
overlapping-cohort miniature shakeout, in association with a gross entry pattern in 
which the early-stage and late-stage cohorts have small numbers of entrants and the 
interim cohorts have large numbers of entrants .3
2 Note that the vertical axis of Panel B of Figure 1 is in log10 scale, which implies that a seemingly 
straight line in such a space would actually be as convex as a log10 function if the vertical axis 
were in a linear scale. Such a convex curve would mean that the earlier the age the higher the exit 
rate.
3It is worth mentioning that such a stylized ‘industry life-cycle’ is directly related to three 
of the four well documented statistical regularities, which are about (1) the size-survival-growth 
relationship and size distribution, (2) age-survival-growth relationship, (3) the shakeout, and (4) 
the turbulence (or firm turnover). For detailed description on these, see Sutton (1997b).
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Source: Klepper 1999
The example of the tires industry shown in Figure 3.1, however, is an extreme 
case. Dramatic aggregate shakeout is not a universal phenomenon. According to 
research currently in progress by Steven Klepper, a good example of an exception 
to the ‘shakeout’ pattern occurs in the laser industry, which has experienced a 
rather long history of growth but so far has shown no sign of an aggregate shake­
out. These differences in the dynamics of aggregate firm numbers across indus­
tries notwithstanding, one statistical regularity holds good across the general run of
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conventionally-defined (4-digit SIC) industries. That is, there are persistent waves of 
entries over time. The key message conveyed by this simple fact is that independent 
opportunities keep emerging in a conventionally-defined industry before it matures. 
This observation matches with the insight described by Sutton (1997a 1997b, 1998), 
that “ most conventionally defined industries exhibit both some strategic interde­
pendence, and some degree of independence across submarkets” . If an industry 
comprises many independent submarkets, then it is natural to see independent op­
portunities emerge over time, which attract persistent waves of entries. When the 
notion of independent submarkets a la Sutton (1997a 1997b, 1998) is applied to 
the issue of industrial growth, the logic would suggest that both the pattern of 
industrial expansion through emergence of independent submarkets, and effect of 
strategic interaction within each submarket, should leave their fingerprints in the 
observed pattern of the industry life-cycle.
Suppose for example, that within each submarket the strategic interaction takes 
the form of price competition and quality choice by producers. (We may interpret 
quality competition as taking the form of vertical product differentiation, or cost- 
reducing process innovation, which requires endogenous R&D or advertising costs.) 
As we noted in Chapter 2 , a concentrated market is the normal outcome where 
quality competition prevails.4
This chapter proposes an unusual but plausible extension of the game-theoretic 
quality competition literature, which emphasizes the role of independent submar­
kets, in order to explain the aforementioned statistical regularities noted above. 
The major scenario to be described is as follows. The uncertainty and informational 
problems surrounding the opening of a new submarket tend to impose credit con­
straints on fixed expenditures by producers. This in turn restricts the pressure of 
quality competition and leads to the viability of an excessive number of entrants in
4 As noted in Chapter 2, this scenario is best formalized by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Sutton 
(1991, Ch. 3) and Sutton (1998, Ch. 15) in the game-theoretic literature. This theme is echoed 
by Klepper (1996, 1999) in the firm-growth literature.
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the early life of a submarket. The miniature shakeout takes place later when the 
initial credit constraints are removed as initial uncertainty regarding the market is 
resolved, and this leads to the escalation of quality competition, which induces the 
exit of a large fraction of existing producers in the submarket. Since an industry 
usually contains many independent submarkets, which emerge and develop in a se­
quence over time, the above scenario is repeated over time, and this induces ‘firm 
turnover’ in the industry. When the emergence of submarkets slows down, gross exit 
of producers will eventually dominate gross entry, and an aggregate shakeout takes 
place.
3.2 The M odel
3.2.1 ‘Independent’ Submarkets
There are S  identical consumers in the economy, each of whose utility function has 
the form of:
where Xi is the consumption of variety i of the ‘X ’ good, k  is number of varieties of
the ‘X ’ good in the given period, y is the numeraire, standing for all other goods.
The difference between this utility function and the usual formulation is that it
allows the increase in k to  bring some unconventional shocks to the utility function.
This feature is embedded in (k ) and 7  (k ) such tha t 0 < 7  (k) < 1, > 0
and >  0 , therefore they capture the idea tha t the increase of the varieties
has a  business stealing effect on all existing varieties and it makes all varieties
closer substitutes between themselves. The strength of the business stealing effect
will depend on the specification5 of 4/ (k) and 7  (k). For the sake of simplicity
5 For example, if it is specified that ’F (k ) =  k , the utility function will become U  =  
 ^X]£=i x l ^  +  Vi which implies a very strong business stealing effect.
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and without loss of generality over the issues to be discussed, it is specified as 
(k) = 7  (k ), hence the utility function is specified further to
u = ^ l t x P ) + y- (3-1)
In any period each consumer maximizes U subject to the budget constraint: 
Yli=iPix i +  V ^  I* where I  is the total consumption in the given period6. The first 
order condition of this maximization program is:
7 —1
= P i ,
which implies that the demand function of variety i is
(3.2)
where Xi = Sx{.
The price elasticity of demand is constant in each period as follows,
a h ^  =  _ i _
9 In pi I - 7 ’ ( ' '
for which > 0  implies | |  > 0  (elasticity enhancing effect).
The above specific utility function implies that the business stealing effect notwith­
standing, the demand over each variety is only dependent on its own price in any 
given period. In other words, the submarkets of the ‘X’ industry are strategically 
independent of each other.
3.2.2 Industrial Growth via the Emergence o f Submarkets
The above specific utility function also implies that the growth of the industry is
through the emergence of new submarkets. It is further assumed in this chapter
6Each consumer’s intertemporal optimization program is completely trivialized by the specifi­
cation of a quasi-linear utility function and unity discount factor, and the implicit assumption that 
all £X ’ goods axe unstorable.
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that the number of submarkets in period t, i.e., k (t), follows a generalized Logistic 
diffusion curve:
k =  ake (b — k)X 
< k (t) = 0  for t < 0  , (3-4)
k (0 ) =  1
where b (b > 1 ) is the saturation number of independent submarkets within the 
industry. This law of motion captures the feature that growth of the number of 
submarkets is dependent on the existing number and the potential which hasn’t been 
fulfilled. This feature can be demonstrated easily with the example: 0 = A =  1, 
which simplifies the law of motion to:
k = ak(b — k ) ,
to which the closed-form solution is7:
beabt
~  c _|_ ga&t ’
where c is a constant. The implied rate of emergence of submarkets is:
ab2 ceabt k — --
(c +  e a b t ) 2
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show some general features of the generalized Logistic diffu­
sion curve: (1 ) it is initially convex up to some point, then (2 ) it becomes concave,
and finally (3) it becomes flat. Accordingly, the growth rate initially increases up 
to a peak, then declines, finally converges to zero.
The second order derivative of k (t) is as follows,
k =  a (9 +  A) k6~l (b — fc) A_1 (  ^  — k \ ^  0 when k §  - ,
v ' v ' \Q + \  J < > 0 + \
which reveals that the peak of growth rate is located at the point such that k = .
7Note that +  b^kjjt  =  ancl ^  k1 (b-k) =  a >^ which imply the displayed general solution.
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3.2.3 M odelling Com petition w ithin a Submarket
Whenever a new independent submarket emerges, the following game starts to be 
played.
Phase One (credit-constrained phase):
Stage one: entry decision when there is credit constraint —>
Stage two: quality (or productivity) choice,
Stage three: quantity competition (Cournot).
Phase Two (credit-unconstrained phase):
Stage one: entry decision when there is no credit constraint—> N 2  (t),
Stage two: quality (or productivity) choice,
Stage three: quantity competition (Cournot).
The Phase One game is played only in one period, and the Phase Two game 
is repeated in each subsequent period. The rationale of this game is that the first 
period, which is the beginning of the submarket, is marked by the uncertainty about 
each producer’s capability of handling the technology of improving quality, there­
fore no external finance is involved in the investments in quality. As a result each 
producer’s quality choice is restricted by a credit constraint. At the end of the first 
period, the uncertainty is resolved. Only those players who have proven high capa­
bilities enter Phase Two, when credit constraints are removed. In other words, after 
one period in the history of each submarket, a wave of selective financial shocks 
affects the efficient players and transforms them into credit-un-constrained players. 
It is further assumed that only those players who have successful track records in 
the previous period are eligible for re-entry in any period of phase two.
The above description is the idea which motivates our modelling. However for 
the sake of simplicity, we will not explicitly model the efficiency-based financial 
selection process. Instead we will assume that some random selection takes place
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among the symmetric players, which selects a particular equilibrium among all the 
possible symmetric equilibrium outcomes.
3.2.4 The Games o f Quality C om petition w ith  and without 
Credit Constraints
It is assumed that the quality achieved by each player in any period is not carried 
over to the next period due to depreciation. Under this assumption, except for a shift 
of parameter, each period of the repeated game almost becomes an isolated game, 
the equilibrium of which can be characterized without reference to what happens 
elsewhere. Therefore the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a sufficient solution 
concept for characterizing the game formulated in this chapter.
The three-stage game in each submarket during each period then can be solved 
by backward induction. The third stage subgame is always a Cournot game of 
quantity competition, for which a Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists and is unique up 
to a given set of quality levels of all incumbents. The subgame Nash equilibrium 
determines for each producer a reduced form profit function as follows8:
_ /  , x a ( N -  1 +  7 ^ A  1 A  N - 1  +
where Ui is the quality level of producer i, is a (N  — l)-tuple of quality levels of 
other producers except producer z, for i = 1 , 2 , • • • , N\ N  is the number of producers 
active in the submarket and S  is the population of consumers in the economy.
Interested readers can find the derivation of this reduced form profit function 
in Appendix B. The key feature of it is that a producer’s profit increases with 
its relative quality level against its rivals’, i.e., Ylf= i ^i - This function tells how 
the strategic environment responds to vertical differentiations of producers. It cap­
tures the Darwinian selection pressure embedded in the environment constituted
8This formulation is an extension of the one developed in Appendix 15.1 of Sutton (1998). It 
allows a general 7  £ [0,1) while the Sutton (1998) formulation deals with a special case: 7  =  0 .
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by customers and rivals. This environment provides producers with incentives to 
outperform their rivals in R&D and quality. When they vie in quality, each of them 
has to bear a fixed cost, which is a function of quality level as shown below:
p in credit-un-constrained phase
F  (ui) =  < fiu? if fiu f < 6  . . , (3.6)
in credit-constrained phase
oo if /zuf > 6
where 8 is the credit limit in the first period. The above fixed cost function is 
depicted in Figure 3.4, which shows that in the credit constrained phase, the effect 
of the credit constraint (8) is equivalent to putting an upper bound to the quality 
level.
With credit constraint
Without credit constraint
84" F(u)
1.4
Figure 3.4: Fixed cost functions
Therefore each producer’s objective in second stage subgame is to maximize its 
net profit by choosing own quality level given others’ quality levels,
m “ H w f < 3 - 7 )
If we take the above payoff function as given, then the game in each period is 
merely a simple game of quality competition with free entry.
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3.3 Equilibrium
3.3.1 Market Structure in the Credit-un-constrained Phase
We proceed to characterize the equilibrium, starting with Phase Two, when credit 
constraints have been removed for remaining players. The focus is on a symmetric 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, where each producer equates the marginal benefit 
of increasing quality and the marginal cost. The implied best-reply function for each 
producer in a symmetric outcome is
+  (3.8)
where N 2 is the number of producers in a Phase Two equilibrium.
Free entry into the submarket results in the following zero profit condition in a 
symmetric outcome:
(3.9)
The above two conditions determine the equilibrium submarket structure and 
the equilibrium endogenous fixed cost level as shown in Figure 3.5. The graph also 
indicates that the equilibrium without credit constraints depends on parameter 7 : 
when 7  increases the submarket structure becomes more concentrated (point B  vs. 
point A), i.e., N  decreases.9
P ro p o sitio n  12 10In a symmetric Phase Two equilibrium, the number of producers 
is N 2 = n (/? ,7 ) =  n°+\/no~2^ - J ^  where no =  1 +  (^+2X1~7) . Furthermore N 2 is 
decreasing in 7 .
P roof. See Appendix B.
9 An increase in 7  shifts the Zero-profit curve downward and to the left, but shifts the Best-reply
curve upward and to the right. The net effect however, is dominated by the former. In fact, as
illustrated in the graph the second effect is quantitatively very small compared to the first, so it
can be ignored for the sake of simplicity.
10The result is consistent with that found in Dasgupta-Stiglitz (1980).
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Figure 3.5: Equiliria without credit constraints
3.3.2 Market Structure in the Credit-constrained Phase
It is assumed that with the credit constraints, the credit-un-constrained equilibrium 
fixed cost level is not feasible, therefore the credit constraints must be binding. So 
the following binding credit constraint should replace the best reply condition in 
determining the equilibrium fixed cost level:
Fc =  tiu l =  S. (3.10)
Accordingly, the zero profit condition should be modified to:
Fc =  ^  =  S 1- ^  (  ( l  -  1 ^ 2 )  ^  , (3.11)
where Ni is the number of producers in the Phase One (credit-constrained) equilib­
rium.
The above two conditions determine the equilibrium submarket structure and the 
equilibrium endogenous fixed cost level as shown in Figure 3.6. It can be seen from 
the graph that the submarket is more fragmented when there is credit constraint 
(point B) than when there isn’t (point A), yet the tighter the credit constraints the 
more fragmented the submarket (point C vs. point B).
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Figure 3.6: Equilibria with and without credit constraints
P ro p o sitio n  13 Under the assumption: (3 > the tighter the binding credit 
constraints are, the more fragmented the submarket is. Also, there is a lower bound 
to N\ such that N i > n(/?, 7 ), i.e., when the credit constraints are strictly binding, 
the submarket is more fragmented than if there were no credit constraints.
P roof. See Appendix B.
3.3.3 M iniature Shakeouts and Cohort Survival Pattern
Since all submarkets which emerge in the same period are similar, any cohort dy­
namics is merely a reflection of the dynamics of a representative submarket which 
belongs to that cohort, so a good point of departure in understanding cohort dy­
namics is to look at what kind of shocks a typical submarket experiences over time.
As the industry grows, it becomes ‘tighter’ in the sense that it is filled with 
more submarkets. Consequently, the price elasticity of demand in each submarket 
increases. This insight is captured by ^  > 0, which implies:
d'jt d j t dk
dt dk dt > 0. (3.12)
For a representative submarket, this means a series of shocks to the price elas­
ticity of demand over time. By Proposition 12, the effects of these shocks should
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Figure 3.7: Evolution of submarket structure
make the submarket more and more concentrated, which implies a persistent exit of 
producers over time. In addition to this kind of exit pressure, the selective financial 
shocks which occur in the first period of the representative submarket may cause a 
more dramatic wave of exit of incumbents.
The evolution of the of structure of a typical submarket is illustrated by Figure 
3.7, where point A stands for the initial credit-constrained equilibrium and points 
B, C and D stand for the subsequent credit-un-constrained equilibria. The jump 
from A to B is caused by two waves of shocks: the selective financial shocks and 
the shock to demand elasticity. Subsequent shifts: from B to C, from C to D and 
so on are due only to shocks to demand elasticity11, and therefore are less dramatic. 
The typical cohort survival pattern is described by the following
Proposition 14 Each cohort experiences a sequence o f shocks such tha t a fter one 
period, there is a wave o f selective financia l shocks, and in  all periods there are 
gam m a shocks which shift the param eter 7 upward. Consequently, each cohort ex­
periences a m in ia ture shakeout a fter one period, and continuous decline o f  num ber  
o f producers in  subsequent periods. I f  the binding credit constraints are sufficiently
11 The increases of 7  should shift the best-reply curve upward and to the left. Since the effects 
of these changes are dominated by the effects of the changes to zero-profit curve, therefore are 
ignored in the graph, without causing non-trivial bias.
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tight then each entry cohort has a higher first period hazard rate than subsequent 
periods.
3.3.4 Aggregate Shakeouts
We now examine the pattern that emerges at the aggregate (industry-wide) level. 
The aggregate pattern depends, for any given cohort survival pattern, on the industry- 
specific characteristics regarding growth, which can be captured by a set of pa­
rameters such as (a,b,Q, A), embedded in the law of motion of industrial growth: 
§  =  ah? (6 -  k ) \
For example, in an industry which consists of a large number of strategically 
independent submarkets where the finks between submarkets are very weak, then 
b should be large, 6 —> 0 and A —► 0. Consequently the observer would not see 
a dramatic aggregate shakeout at all. Instead, she would observe a very slow but 
steady build-up of number of producers during a long period in that industry. This 
pattern can arise due to the extreme specification of the generalized logistic curve:
~  =  ak9 (b — k)x —> a. 
dt v '
In less extreme settings, however, the observer would be able to see some kind of 
aggregate shakeout. Generally, the larger 6 and A in a industry, the more dramatic 
the aggregate shakeout. In the next section, we calibrate the parameters of the 
model and simulate the process of an industry life-cycle. Two different cases will be 
distinguished with respect to the aggregate pattern.
3.4 Simulations o f Industry Life-Cycle
3.4.1 Case 1: W ith Aggregate Shakeouts
The specification of the k-7  relationship is as follows, 7  =  1 — eexp (to (—k +  1 )). 
The specification of the parameters are shown in the following table. (The range of
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parameter values has been chosen rather arbitrarily in order to illustrate the working 
of the mechanism, and is not justified by reference to specific empirical examples.)
P a ra m e te r: a b e A & 8 S /* e u
Value: 0.0004 50 1 .8 1.5 2 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.9 0.05
The rough simulation indicates that the model can account for the typical pat­
terns of aggregate shakeout, persistent turbulence and cohort dynamics. Figure 3.8 
depicts the simulated aggregate shakeout and the correlated gross entry and gross 
exit over time. This graph resembles the real world picture presented in Panel A 
of Figure 3.1. The predicted correlation between gross entry and gross exit over 
time is 0.76, which is comparable with an estimated number from another source12. 
Figure 3.9 further breaks the aggregate shakeout pattern down to separated cohort 
dynamics. It suggests that the dramatic rise and fall of the total number of produc­
ers around the peak are largely due to impacts of a very few big cohorts (9, 10 and 
1 1 ), which feature “mass entry waves followed by mass exit waves” . The pattern of 
‘miniature shakeout’ is demonstrated by Figure 3.10, which shows that the early-age 
exit hazard is significantly higher than subsequent ages in each cohort. The conse­
quent typical cohort survival pattern then is presented in Figure 3.11, which shows 
the average survival rates over age. The simulated pattern qualitatively resembles 
the real fife pattern presented in Panel B of Figure 3.1.
12 Empirically, within any one country, a strong correlation is found to exist between entry and 
exit rates by industry. For example, Paul Geroski (1991) reports a correlation coefficient of 0.796 
for a sample of 95 industries in the U.K. in 1987.
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Figure 3.10: Cohort exit rates: age 2-5 (simulation 1 ), horizontal axis: cohort
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Figure 3.11: Average cohort survival pattern (simulation 1 ), horizontal axis: age
3.4.2 C ase 2: W ith ou t A ggregate Shakeouts
Now we proceed to verify the point that if an industry consists of a large number 
of submarkets which have very weak links with the rest of the industry, i.e., b 
is sufficiently large and 6 and A are sufficiently small, then dramatic aggregate 
shakeout should not take place. The following specification of parameters embodies 
these features.
P aram eter: a b e A 0 6 s e u
Value: 0.4 50 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 2 0 0 1 0 150000 1 0.9 0.0005
The simulation confirms the conjecture. Figure 3.12 shows a simulated industry 
life-cycle without an aggregate shakeout. It is worth mentioning that this result 
does not rely on any qualitative difference in cohort survival pattern. Figure 3.13- 
3.15 show that the simulated cohort survival pattern in this new specification is 
qualitatively similar to the previous one.
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Figure 3.12: vertical axis: number of producers, horizontal axis: time (simulation 
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Figure 3.13: Cohort dynamics (simulation 2), vertical axis: number of producers, 
horizontal axis: time
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Figure 3.14: Cohort exit rates: age 2-5 (simulation 2), horizontal axis: cohort
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Figure 3.15: Average cohort survival pattern (simulation 2), horizontal axis: age
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
This analysis uses the notion of ‘independent submarkets’ introduced by Sutton 
(1997a, 1997b), in which a game-theoretic model of the markets that incorporates 
strategic interactions within submarkets with (approximate) independence across 
submarkets. In this chapter, we have used this idea to explain some well-documented 
statistical regularities regarding the evolution of market structure. The results offer 
a simple candidate explanation for these regularities, while some extensions of the 
model might be needed in order to capture some secondary features of the process, 
this simple structure appears to be adequate as a representation of the main features 
of these processes on which empirical researchers have agreed.
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Chapter 4 
R adical Innovation, Selection o f 
Technology and M arket Structure
4.1 Introduction
It has been widely noted that the early history of many industries, such as aircraft, is 
marked by coexistence of rival technical trajectories (biplanes, monoplanes; wooden 
construction, metal construction, etc.). But in due course one trajectory emerges as 
the winner, or ‘dominant trajectory’ (Abernathy and Utterbach, 1978).
Even when an industry has settled down along some established trajectory, how­
ever, it is often the case that new discoveries make possible the exploration of a rival 
trajectory. This can have profound consequences for market structure.
For example, when valve technology was replaced by transistor technology, this 
was accompanied by the exit of all major US valve producers, and their replacement 
by a different population of firms, that developed expertise in the new silicon-based 
technologies (Sutton, 1998). A contemporary example, which is emerging at present, 
relates to traditional color film, which may be displaced by the new generation of 
digital cameras.
The relation between market competition and the rate and direction of tech­
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nological change under such circumstances may take a complex form. On the one 
hand, competition may exist among firms all of whom follow the same “technology” 
of innovation, or ‘technological trajectory’. On the other hand, different firms may 
follow different “technologies” of innovation, or ‘technological trajectories’, which 
are substitutable.
In this chapter we examine competition in an industry which faces the appearance 
of a new (R&D) trajectory (technology) . 1 The new technology is superior to the old 
one in the sense that it costs less to achieve the same product quality level. Will 
the new technology replace the old one, will it fail to have any impact, or will both 
technologies coexist in the new equilibrium?
By characterizing equilibrium outcomes in terms of the arrival of new entrants, 
the subsequent form of quality competition and the exit of incumbent firms, we 
examine how the market resolves the competition between the rival technologies. 
We find that the outcome depends crucially on the relative attractiveness of the 
new technology as against the old one.
In one polar case, if the new trajectory is sufficiently superior to the old, then 
entrant firms following the new trajectory possess great advantages over incumbents 
in winning market share; their profits are large enough to cover their sunk costs and 
therefore justify their entry. On the other side, the incumbents’ profitability is 
so badly damaged by the intensified competition that they are forced to exit the 
market. In the opposite polar case where the advantage of the new trajectory over 
the old one is relatively small, new entrants will not be able to win enough market 
share and earn sufficient profit to cover their initial fixed costs. Due to their first 
movers’ advantage, the incumbents who suffer a slight technological disadvantage 
can successfully deter new entry. In cases intermediate between these extremes, we 
get the coexistence of incumbents and new entrants, and so the presence of both the
1 There is of course an analogy between the competition among rival trajectories, and the com­
petitive process analyzed by Schumpeter (1934), who was concerned with the process of ‘creative 
destruction’.
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old and the new technologies. An important conclusion in what follows is tha t these 
qualitative patterns are not affected by whether the innovation is unanticipated, or 
is anticipated, by incumbents.
The plan for the remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section 2  presents the 
basic model, starting with the simplest setting, where the technological breakthrough 
is unanticipated and takes place immediately after the incumbents have committed 
their sunk costs to the existing technology; the number of new entrants is assumed 
to be fixed to one at first, and is later endogenized. Section 3 looks at the case where 
a future technological breakthrough is anticipated, so that the incumbents take this 
into account when investing in R&D along the existing technology.
4.2 Basic M odel
4.2.1 Consumer Choice over Quality
Following Sutton (1998), we consider the following utility function shared by all 
consumers:
U = z 1-“ ,
where Xi and Ui are the quantity and quality of ‘quality good’ provided by the firm 
i and z  is the quantity of the ‘outside good’. A consumer’s decision problem is to 
maximize her utility subject to a budget constraint. This Cobb-Douglas form utility 
function has the following feature: The consumer spends fraction a of her income on 
the quality good, and fraction (1  — a) on the ‘outside good’. The total expenditure 
on the quality good is therefore independent of qualities and prices and equals a 
fraction a  of the total consumer income. We notate the total expenditure on quality 
good by S.
Since each consumer chooses a quality that maximizes Ui/pi, it follows that all 
goods that command positive sales at equilibrium must have equal quality-adjusted
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price, i.e. Pi/ui =  A, for all i. The constant A, and so the vector of equilibrium 
prices, is determined by ^2 piXi = ^ A UiXi =  S, so th a t A =  S / (]T) UiXi).
4.2.2 A Reduced-form Profit Function
We assume all the ‘quality goods’ are produced at some constant marginal cost 
c > 0. In the Coumot-Nash equilibrium in quantities, the profit flow earned by firm 
i among the N  firms offering these goods is2
A nice feature of the above reduced-form profit function is that the term I 1 —
V  ^ 3= 1  u  j
represents firm z’s market share as well as its mark-up ratio. Therefore firm i will 
only be active if 1 — > 0 , otherwise it exits the market.
A - j = i  tij-
4.2.3 The Game
The quality good industry is organized as a quality competition game which has two 
parts as follow.
Part one*
• Stage 1: A sufficiently large number of firms simultaneously choose whether 
to enter a market4. The number is large enough in the sense that some will 
choose not to enter in equilibrium.
• Stage 2: After observing the number of entry N , the firms which have already
entered simultaneously choose their quality levels and implement the quality
2For the derivation of this reduced form profit function, see Appendix 15.1 of Sutton (1998).
3Part one of the model is exactly the Cournot model with quality choice by Sutton (1991). This
part of game is played entirely independent of what will happen in the second part because they
are unexpected at all.
4We assume that all entrants at this stage can commit to invest at stage 2.
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by investing in R&D. The R&D costs are determined by the following fixed 
cost function:
F (u) =  (fiu)13 ,
where u is the quality level and // is the parameter of the R&D technology. 
The overall payoff function for firm i then is:
Y  (ui | (u-i)) =  n  (ui | (u_i)) -  F (ui) =  s ( l  -  M  -  {fiUif .
V l ^ j=i ^  /
For the sake of simplicity we confine attention to the case where the outcome 
of Part one is a symmetric equilibrium such that all firms have equal quality 
level u.
Part two
We assume that after the fixed and sunk costs have been incurred, an unexpected 
technological shock occurs.
• Stage 3 : A new R&D technology indexed by / /  ( // <  /x) becomes available. 
One potential new entrant chooses whether to enter the market. If she enters 
then she also chooses her quality level, which without loss of generality can be 
notated by ku. The new entrant’s payoff function is:
Y  (k u  | («)) = 5 (l -  jfikS) 2 -  (»'kuf  ■
Here we have implicitly assumed that the incumbents axe not allowed to  re­
spond to a new entry by changing their quality levels. Later in Appendix C 
we will show that relaxing this assumption will not change the result: to make 
no change in their quality levels after the new entry is the equilibrium strategy 
for the incumbents.
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4.2.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept used throughout this chapter is pure strategy sub-game 
perfect equilibrium. The analysis is made much easier when we only focus on the 
symmetric outcomes. We assume that in stage 2, all firms choose quality level u 
except firm i chooses quality level u. Then firm Vs maximization problem is:
m a x Y t (u  \ u) = i m  ^ 5  ( l  -  g (/ _ ~ } +  J . (4-1)
(4.2)
where we normalize fi = 1 for the incumbents.
The first order condition for any symmetric outcome is: 
dYi Ar ' Ar
du
Since each firm has a non-entry option, the following non-loss-making condition 
should be satisfied:
= 5  ( l  -  Z j j T )  -  V? > 0. (4.3)
Combining the above two conditions we can derive the following inequality which 
determines the number firms in Part one:
N  +  ± - 2 <  (4.4)
At equilibrium N  is the maximum integer5 that satisfies the above inequality.
R em ark  15 The driving force behind market concentration in this model is the 
presence of increasing returns to scale, in the following sense: the specifications of 
the utility function: U = ^ ^ 2=1 uix i^ j z l~a, and the fixed cost function: hi = u f , 
(/3 > 0 ) 6 and the assumption of constant marginal cost imply that the effective long­
term production function is:
i
Vi = UiXi = h? f  (ktJi)
5In this study, we emphasize the integer effect, which allows positive net payoff to exist even
when there is free entry.
6Here we notate the R&D effort by h.
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Figure 4.1: N  = n((3)
where /(*,*) is the short-term production function and is homogenous of degree 1 
in (ki,li) , so the output yi is homogeneous of degree (1  +  1 //?) in overall input 
(hi,ki,li), which indicates increasing returns to scale. Furthermore, the value of pa­
rameter j3 determines the value of N  in the following way:
0 < /? < 1 2 < 1 +  1 //? N  = 1 natural monopoly
1 < /? < 8/3 +> 1 +  3/8 < 1 +  l /P  < 2  <=$■ N  = 2 natural duopoly
8/3 < p  1 +  1//? < 1  +  3/8 TV > 3 natural oligopoly
At equilibrium AT is a function of P, i.e., N  = n(p) ,  and N  is the largest integer 
such that
N <  l  +  i/3  +  i y /8 + + .  (4.5)
The function n (/?) is not continuous, therefore it jumps at critical values of p. 
This can be visualized by Figure 4.1. The small box in the figure represents the 
specific example of P = 4. Since we are interested in the impacts of increases in 
firm numbers we will by-pass the monopoly and duopoly cases and focus on the case 
where that p  > |  is satisfied and consequently N  > 3.
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Solving eq. (4.2) for u  as a function of S, N  and (3:
u = (4.6)
So far, what we have got are all standard outcomes from the Cournot model with 
‘perceived quality’. The novel content of the analysis begins from part two.
In stage 3, a single entrant maximizes her overall payoff:
There are two unknowns, k and / / ,  in equation (4.8). To solve the model, we 
need to introduce a second equation linking these parameters.
It is worth to mention that our main concern is under what circumstances a profit 
maximizing potential new entrant will enter in equilibrium. We can imagine that 
there exists some threshold value for the parameter / /  such that below which, an 
entry will occur and above which any potential entry will be deterred in equilibrium. 
If this is the case, then we want to pin down the threshold value of / / .  Apparently 
in such a threshold case, the new entrant should be indifferent between entering or 
not, i.e. the entrant is exactly at the break-even point. So the following break-even 
condition holds:
(4.7)
the first order condition of which is:
— — (fi'ku) =  0 . (4.8)
(4.9)
Combining equations (4.8) and (4.9) to eliminate (fi'ku)^ and S  results in the 
following equation with k as the only unknown:
/3N2k2 -  N k  (-2(3 + (3N  +  2N) + 0 - 0 N  = 0. (4.10)
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The unique positive solution to the above equation is:
-2 /3N  + 0 N 2 + 2 N 2 + (-8/3 JV3 + (32N 4 + 4 /3N4 + 4 N 4) * , m
k = ----------------------------------- 2/3N2----------------------------------- = K ( N , 0 ) .
(4.11)
Manipulating eq. (4.8) to solve for p' leads to 
1 /  2 S N 3k2 + 2 S N 2k - 2 S N 3k \ $
** "  ku  V —f3k3N 3 -  Z(3k2N 2 -  3/3kN ~ p )  ' *• ' ’
Inserting eq. (4.6) into eq. (4.12) and eliminating u  and S , \j!  turns out to be a
function of /c, N  and (3 as follows
J  =  i f __________ N * k ( N k  + l - N ) __________ \ i
M k \ ( k 3N 3 + 3k2N 2 + 3 N k + l ) ( N 2 - 2 N  + l ) J  K ' 1
=  3  ( k ,N ,P) .
By IV =  n  (/?) and eq. (4.11), eq. (4.13) turns out to  be a  function of (3 as follows
H’ =  E ( K ( N , 0 ) , N , 0 )  
=  E { K ( n ( P )  ,0) , n (0)  ,0)
= $(13). (4.14)
Figure 4.2 illustrates <E> ((3). We see that it is not continuous: it jumps at critical 
values of (3 because N  jumps. Again, the small box represents the specific example 
of (3 =  4.
In Appendix C we show that the sufficient condition for the maximum has been 
satisfied by checking on the related second order condition. In Appendix C we also 
show that even if the incumbents are allowed to respond to the entrant’s quality 
choice, the equilibrium outcome is exactly the same as if the incumbents were not 
allowed to respond.
P ro p o sitio n  16 For the basic model, there exists a threshold value of /j!, i.e. fith, 
such that:
I f  f j  > fith, then no new entry occurs in equilibrium;
< (ith, then new entry occurs in equilibrium.
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Figure 4.2: p th = $  (0)
E xam ple  17 When (3 = A, uA — ^ S  (oru = 0.521754) f 
k = n  + u ' / W  = 1.0458, iith =  0.9610.
This proposition claims that the vulnerability of the existing market structure 
to a technological breakthrough is conditional on the relative merits of the new and 
old technologies. If the new technology doesn’t enjoy a significant advantage over 
the old technology, the potential new entry will be deterred and the existing market 
structure will not change. On the other hand, if the new technology possesses a 
significant advantage over the old, it will be adopted by some potential entrant(s). 
The existing market structure will change as new entry occurs.
C oro llary  18 An anticipated technological breakthrough which will lead to p! > 
Pth fath as defined in Proposition 16) has no effect on the incumbents’ competitive 
behavior.
The intuition for the above corollary is as follows: consider the actions chosen by 
incumbents in the original game. For this configuration of parameter values, these 
actions constitute an optimal reply to the potential entrant’s decision to not enter. 
Moreover, given these actions, it is optimal for the potential entrant not to enter.
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4.2.5 Endogenizing the Num ber o f Entrants
We now relax the assumption that the number of new entrants is fixed at unity. 
Part two of the game is now altered as follows:
Part two
• Stage 3: A new technology //, ( // < 1 ), becomes available. A (large) number 
of potential entrants choose whether to seize the opportunity to enter the 
market.
•  Stage 4- After observing the number of new entry the new entrants si­
multaneously choose their quality levels and invest in R&D to implement the 
quality levels.
Again we will only focus on symmetric outcomes, i.e., we assume all the incum­
bents have the same quality level u and all the new entrants have the same quality 
level ku. Consequently, an incumbent’s payoff is:
2
Y* (a | (o), (M)) = s(l- — vP.
Conditional on all the others playing their equilibrium strategies in the sym­
metric equilibrium, the new entrant j  whose quality level is ku  faces the following 
maximization problem:
maxYl (ku I (u ) , (ku)) = max I S I 1 ---------^  —-4------] — (/Jt'ku)^
(4.15)
the first order condition of which for a symmetric outcome is:
9k k=k V k N  + N x )  (k N  + Nx) k k
(4.16)
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Again, the following non-loss-making condition must be satisfied:
In a symmetric equilibrium, for a given / / ,  Afi should be the maximum integer 
that satisfies the above conditions. Otherwise one more potential entrant could 
profitably deviate by entering.
In the threshold cases, the new entrants just break even, therefore the following 
break-even condition becomes useful:
/3N2k2 -  (Ai (2  — (3) +  {N -  1 ) (2  +  P)) N k  -  (Nx (2 Afi -  4 +  2N  +  N p  -  ff) +  2  -  2N) =  0
where k,\ (N i , N, p)
_  (V 1(2-/3 )+ (V -1)(2+ /3))V + V ((W i(2-/? )+ (A T -1)(2+ /3))N )2+4/3AT2(;Vi(2V1-4 + 2V + V /? -/3 )+ 2 -2 ;V )
~  2 (3N2
Knowing that N  = n(p) ,  equation (4.19) implies:
Combining equations (4.16) and (4.17) to eliminate (if i ' k u and S  results in the 
following equation:
(4.18)
the unique positive solution of which is
(4.19)
k = Ki (N i , n (P) , p) = k (Nu P) . (4.20)
Equations (4.6) and (4.17) jointly imply that threshold value of y,' is
Pth = Xi ( N i , N , k , 0 )
iV+iVT-1
N k+Niwhere Xi { Ni , N , k , p )  = ( ( l 2N2-4 N + 2  j k
Given that N  — n(P),  fith then is a known function of N\ and p, i.e.,
=  X! (JVi , n ( 0 ) M N i , 0 ) , 0 )  =  X  (M . 0 )  ■ (4.21)
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A useful way to gain more insight into the relation between the technological 
parameter y', the market structure N i and the quality level of the new entrant(s) k 
is to work out a concrete example.
E xam ple  19 Set /3 = 4, then N  = 3, k = Nl+6+V 9^  +28Ari+jjj am^
Vth =  (* ~  i S ) 2 ( ¥ ) i  %■ Consequently,
when Ni = l, k =  1.0458 and y th = 0.9610;
when Ni — 2 ,k  — 1.2153 and y th =  0.8516;
when N\ = 3, k =  1.3835 and y th = 0.7598.
In the above example, y th =  0.9610, 0.8516 and 0.7598 are the three threshold 
values of fi' at which the market structure changes. For a given value of / /  we can 
calculate the corresponding market structure by looking at which interval fi' falls 
into.
After determining the equilibrium market structure, we then can calculate the 
associated quality level of the new entrant (s) k by manipulating equations (4.6) and
(4.16), which determine k as a function of y! via the following equation
JV3 (fcJV -  N  + 1) (N  +  iVi -  1 ) (fciV + N i — 1) _  ,
(N  -  i f  (In  + N i ) 3
In the example: /3 = 4, N  = 3, the above equation takes the form of
^  (3k -  2) (JV, +  2) 3^ + Nl  - 1  =
4 ,K ’ (Zk + N f ) 3
Figure 4.3 illustrates the relation between y! and /c, conditional on N\.  We see 
in the graph that for a given pair of N  and Ni,  when y! decreases, k increases, i.e., 
the relation is monotone. We can see that when y! reaches the next threshold value, 
Ni  will increase by 1 .
Our calculation leads to the following results:
•  When y r > 0.9610, there is no new entry;
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Figure 4.3:
•  When 0.9610 <  / /  <  0.8516, there is one new entrant, and as / /  decreases 
from 0.9610 towards 0.8516, k increases from 1.0458 towards 1.2365.
• When 0.8516 <  / /  < 0.7598, there are two new entrants, and as / /  decreases 
from 0.8516 towards 0.7598, k increases from 1.2153 towards 1.4051.
•  When n' > 0.7598, the number of new entrants becomes three, and this is the 
highest possible number of new entrants in any symmetric equilibria in this 
example.
It is worth to notice that when /j! is sufficiently small, the number of the new 
entrants can reach its highest possible level and the quality level of the new entrants 
can be so high that competition between the new entrants drives the quality-adjusted 
prices below the incumbents’ marginal costs, so that the incumbents find it optimal 
to exit to avoid further losses. To characterize this situation, we first look at the 
threshold value of k for an incumbent to exit:
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where the left hand side is the market share as well as the mark-up ratio of an 
incumbent. The equation implies
e  =  (4 2 2 )
In the current example, the largest possible number for N\ is 3, so if k =  =
1.5 then the incumbents’ total market share becomes zero, and accordingly, fith —
0.7119. When / /  <  0.7119 and k > 1.5, we know that all the incumbents will exit 
the market; but we want to know whether the incumbents have already had any 
impact on the competitive behavior of the new entrants.
The situation in which the incumbents all exit after the technological break­
through and so make no impact on the competitive behavior of the new entrants 
will be referred to in what follows as a drastic innovation (or drastic replacement). 
In the case of a drastic innovation, a new entrant’s maximization problem is replaced 
by the following problem:
maxYj (ku \ (ku))  =  max ( s  ^1 -  ~
implying that the incumbents can be ignored when a new entrant chooses her quality 
level. The symmetric first order condition is
2 g (JV^ :1 )2  =  P ( n 'k u f  (4.23)
and the non-loss-making condition is
-§3 > m 13 • (4.24)
The above two conditions imply that
N l ~ 2 + ~ k  -  2 ’
which is the same as (4.4), therefore Ni = N  — n{(5).
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Then (4.23) jointly with eq. (4.6) suggests
= 2 s{J ^ f  = 2 S ^ 0 ~  = ^
which implies
So the sufficient and necessary condition for a drastic replacement is
(  N X = N  = n(0)
< k = ^7 ,
k >— JV-1
which is equivalent to p' < . Then the corresponding threshold value of p' is
N - l  , n x
Vth  — • (4-25)
P ro p o sitio n  20 Wften p' < pth = £/&ere are TV new entrants, k > j jz i ,  all 
the incumbents exit and they have had no impact on the competitive behavior of the 
new entrants, i.e., the innovation is drastic.
In the current example: (3 =  4, N  = 3 then when p' < =  |  =  0.6667, N\ =  3,
k > 1.5 and all the incumbents exit the market. Our previous calculation has already 
shown that when pr < 0.7119, N\ = 3, k > 1.5 and all the incumbents will exit the 
market. So we want to know what is actually going on when 0.6667 < p' <  0.7119. 
It turns out that
• when 0.6667 < p' <  0.7119 there are three new entrants entering, choosing 
the quality level exactly such that k = 1.5 and all the incumbents exit.
In the case stated above, although the incumbents exit the market, they have 
already had impacts on the quality level of the new entrants, which would be lower 
otherwise. Note that in this case, the first order condition (4.16) does not hold
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Figure 4.4:
because at k = the reduced-form profit function is not smooth in k and its first 
order derivative is not defined; instead each new entrant has a corner solution to her 
maximization problem.
Figure 4.4 shows how the market structure and the new entrants’s quality are 
related to the parameter of the new technology // . Table 4.1 summarizes all the 
threshold values of // , corresponding market structure (N,Ni )  and the relative qual­
ity level of the entrants k calculated for the example case of (3 = 4.
From the figure as well as the table we can see a weak monotone relationship 
between / /  and equilibrium number of new entrants N \ . The greater the gap between 
the new technology and the old, the closer we come to the outcome in which the 
market comes to be dominated by new entrants.
The last five columns of the table show the market shares and net payoffs of the 
entrants and the incumbents at each threshold value of / / .  From the table we can 
see that a radical technological breakthrough may reshape the market structure and 
cause reallocation of net payoffs, i.e. oligopoly rents. The size of the gap between 
the new technology and the old determines the extent of the ‘creative destruction’, 
notably, the there is a weak monotone relation between / /  and the combined market 
share of new entrants.
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l^ th N Ni k all ents’ 
share
1 ent’s 
share
1 ent’s 
payoff
1 inc’s 
share
1 inc’s 
payoff
0.9610 3 0 N/A 0 0 0 0.3333 0.0370S
0.9610 3 1 1.0458 0.2749 0.2749 0 0.2417 -0.0157S
0.8516 3 1 1.2365 0.3630 0.3630 0.0407S 0.2123 -0.0290S
0.8516 3 2 1.2153 0.5830 0.2915 0 0.1390 -0.0548S
0.7598 3 2 1.4051 0.7128 0.3564 0.0308S 0.0957 -0.0649S
0.7598 3 3 1.3835 0.9021 0.3007 0 0.0326 -0.0730S
0.7119 3 3 1.5 1 0.3333 0.0148S 0 -0.0741S
0.7119 0 3 1.5 1 0.3333 0.0148S 0 -0.0741S
0.6667 0 3 1.5 1 0.3333 0.0370S 0 -0.0741S
Table 4.1: The symmetric equilibria after the unanticipated technological break­
through
Through the above numerical example we have illustrated the relation between 
market structure, the new entrants’ quality jump and the underlying parameter de­
scribing the new technology. As to more general claims, in addition to Propositions 
16 and 2 0  we also have one further result:
C oro lla ry  2 1  There exist two bounds of \j! , i.e., fin < < 1, such that when
fi' > /ij no new entrant will enter; and when / /  <  nn, n  (f3) new entrants will enter 
and all incumbents will exit.
Figure 4.5 visualizes the existence of the two bounds of / /  in regard of market 
structure.
4.3 Anticipated Future Technological Breakthroughs
In this section we examine the case of an anticipated future technological break­
through, with a view to analyzing how the expectation of this breakthrough by the
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Figure 4.5: The two bounds
incumbents affects their behavior, and so impacts on outcomes before and after the 
technological breakthrough. For the sake of simplicity we study a two-period model, 
associated with the following 4-stage game:
Period one
• Stage 1 : A sufficiently large number of firms simultaneously choose whether 
to enter a market. The market will exist for 2 periods. In each period, the 
market size is S  and the discount rate is 1 . It is anticipated that at the end of 
period one, there will be a technological breakthrough, i.e. a new technology 
will be available.
• Stage 2: After observing the number of entry N , the firms which have already 
entered simultaneously choose their quality levels and implement the quality 
levels by investing in R&D. The fixed cost function is indexed by /i (/i =  1).
Period two
• Stage 3: A new technology indexed by / /  (// < fi )  becomes available. A 
(large) number of potential entrants choose whether to enter the market.
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• Stage 4 : Having observed the number of new entrants each of the new 
entrants simultaneously chooses its quality level and incurs the corresponding 
cost of R&D. The fixed cost function is indexed by // .
To characterize the symmetric equilibrium, let us assume all incumbents choose 
quality level u, except for incumbent i who chooses u. Then firm i maximizes its 
total payoff in the two periods:
maxY* (u | (u ) , (&u))
For symmetric equilibrium, the first order condition is:
- - 1 +  » >  -  » ■ .  < « )
and the non-loss-making condition is:
i + s ( ' - ^ T i ! r )  <t2,>
In the second period, we assume all the new entrants choose quality level ku, 
except for new entrant j  who chooses ku. Then firm j ’s maximization problem 
becomes:
maxY) (ku \ (u) , (fcu))
=  max ( S  ( 1 -------- N ,+ N l'S k  1
u I N k  +  i N , - l ) £  +  l )  ’
which is exactly the same as problem (4.15). Therefore equations (4.16) to (4.19)
also apply to the characterization of the symmetric outcome in this setting, and we
can determine k for the threshold cases.
Furthermore, eq. (4.17) and (4.26) together imply that
ftth
/  /  \ 2  \ *p h  jV+JVj—1
N k + N i
p  (4-28)
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which determines the threshold values of / / .  
Finally, eq. (4.26) implies
( 4 .M )
which determines the corresponding quality levels of the incumbents u.
We consider a numerical example in order to provide some insight into the re­
lation between the technological parameter / / ,  market structure (TV, N\) and the 
quality levels of the new entrant (s) k and of incumbents u.
Exam ple 22 Set 0  =  4:, then N  =  3, k =  ~JVl+6+V 9^ i +28JVl+20>
{ \
2 Z i _ 3 + J V i - l V  
________  \  3 k +Nt  )_________
v 37 )
« =  ( l  ( a  +  and»th =
Consequently,
when Ni = 1, k = = 1.0458, u =  0.61455? and nth = 0.8159;
when Ni = 2 ,k  = ^ ^ 5  =  1.2153, u =  0.58985? and fith = 0.7532; 
when Ni = 3 ,k  = =  1.3835, u  =  0.54285? and nth =  0.7303.
As we can see, p th = 0.8159, 0.7532 and 0.7303 are the three threshold values of 
/ /  at which market structure changes. For a given value of fi' we can determine the 
corresponding market structure by finding which interval / /  lies in. Then we can 
calculate the quality level of the new entrant(s) k using equations (4.16) and (4.26), 
which determine k as a function of p! via the following equation:
< k N - N + l ) ( N  + N 1 - l ) ( k N  + N 1 - l )  f,
= ■
In the example: 0  = 4, N  = 3, the above equation takes the form of
= m 4 -
(3k -  2) (2 +  Ni) (3k + Ni  -  l)  , , t x 4
^  +  {3 -k  +  N i)
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In particular, when Ni = 3, if (ith =  0.7119 then k = 1.5 (the incumbents’ exit 
threshold) and the incumbents’ market share is zero.
When / /  is sufficiently small, the incumbents can foresee that they will exit in 
the second period. So their maximization problem becomes
maxF; (« | a) =  max ( s  ( l  -  g ( j^ _ ~ - +  1)  -  ^
which is the same as problem (4.1). As in problem (4.1), in this case (u)^ =  2
and N  = n(/3). Moreover, all the arguments which lead to  Proposition 20 still hold in 
this case, so that the claim in Proposition 20 is applicable, i.e. when / /  <  fith = ^=1, 
there are N  new entrants, k > jfzi-, all the incumbents exit and they have had 
no impact on the competitive behavior of the new entrants, i.e., the innovation is 
drastic. In the current example, the threshold value of / /  for a drastic innovation is
i, =  Sul =  2 rth 3 3 '
Figure 4.6 illustrates the following results:
• When fj! > 0.8195, there is no new entry;
• When 0.7532 < / /  < 0.8195, there is one new entrant, and as / /  decreases
from 0.8195 towards 0.7532, k increases from 1.0458 towards 1.1874.
87
N Ni u
(xsi)
k all ents’ 
share
1 ent’s 
share
1 ent’s 
payoff
1 inc’s 
share
1 inc’s 
payoff
0.8159 3 0 0.6204 N/A 0 0 0 0.3333 0.0740S
0.8159 3 1 0.6145 1.0458 0.2749 0.2749 0 0.2417 0.0270S
0.7532 3 1 0.6088 1.1874 0.3424 0.3424 0.0294S 0.2192 0.0218S
0.7532 3 2 0.5898 1.2153 0.5830 0.2915 0 0.1390 0.0094S
0.7303 3 2 0.5836 1.2840 0.6330 0.3165 0.0105S 0.1224 0.0101S
0.7303 3 3 0.5428 1.3835 0.9021 0.3007 0 0.0326 0.0254S
0.7119 3 3 0.5217 1.5 1 0.3333 0.0148S 0 0.0370S
0.7119 0 3 0.5217 1.5 1 0.3333 0.0148S 0 0.0370S
0.6667 0 3 0.5217 1.5 1 0.3333 0.0370S 0 0.0370S
Table 4.2: The symmetric equilibria in the model with anticipated future technolog­
ical breakthrough (All the figures are calculated only for the second period except 
that those in the last column are calculated for the sum of both periods.)
•  When 0.7303 <  / /  < 0.7532, there are two new entrants, and as / /  decreases 
from 0.7532 towards 0.7303, k increases from 1.2153 towards 1.2840.
• 0.7119 <  / /  <  0.7303, there are three new entrants, and as y! decreases from
0.7303 towards 0.71119, k increases from 1.3835 towards 1.5.
•  when 0.6667 < y! < 0.7119, there are three new entrants, choosing a quality 
level such that k = 1.5 and all the incumbents exit.
• when < / /  <  0.6667, the innovation is drastic and k > 1.5.
Table 4.2 summarizes all the threshold values of / / ,  the corresponding market 
structure (N,Ni) ,  the relative quality levels of the entrants k and the quality level 
of the incumbents u calculated for the example 0  = 4.
Comparing the results reported in Table 4.2 with those in Table 4.1 of the pre­
vious section, it is reassuring to see that the pattern is qualitatively similar except
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that the efficiency of the anticipated new technology impacts the quality level of 
the incumbents: the more efficient the new technology is, the less aggressive the 
incumbents are in investing in quality.
It can be shown, finally, that certain results obtain in this setting, for all values 
of /?( /?> 8/3). Here, we summarize these results in the form of two properties: 
P ro p e r ty  A: There exists a threshold value of / / ,  i.e. f i th , such that:
If / /  > nth, then no new entry occurs in equilibrium;
If fi ' < f i th , then new entry occurs in equilibrium.
P ro p e r ty  B: There exist two bounds of / / ,  i.e., fin < fix < 1 , such that when 
ji' > n x no new entrant will enter; and when / /  < /ira, n{(3) new entrants will enter 
and all incumbents will exit.
The existence of the two bounds is illustrated by Figure 4.7.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied the competition between two cohorts of radically 
different but substitutable technologies. While the incumbents employing the exis­
tent technology have a first mover advantage, potential entrants have the advantage
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of jumping to the more efficient new technology. By conducting equilibrium analysis 
on the entry of new firms, the exit of incumbents and subsequent quality compe­
tition, we have examined the impact of a radical innovation on market structure 
and on the turnover of firms. The analysis fully characterizes the conditions for 
three possible outcomes: either (1 ) the radically new technology is blocked by the 
existent technology, or (2) the two technologies coexist in the marketplace, or (3) 
the new technology replaces the existent technology. These conditions imply two 
bounds to the efficiency of the new technology, the first of which must be reached 
for ‘creative destruction’ to take place and the second of which suffices for its effects 
to be ‘drastic’.
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Chapter 5
Quality C om petition, Market 
Structure and Technological 
Progress w ith Cohort 
Replacem ents
5.1 Introduction
In exploring the issues raised in Chapter 4, we have already introduced the idea 
that a drastic replacement of the population of firms may follow a technical shock. 
This idea, which I will refer to as ‘cohort replacement’ in what follows, has been 
recognized as an important aspect of technological progress since the contribution 
of Schumpeter (1942). The phenomenon has recently become the subject of formal 
economic modelling in the context of discussions of the Schumpeterian ‘creative 
destruction’ in the R&D-based growth literature (Grossman and Helpman 1992, 
Aghion and Howitt 1992). Differences in details notwithstanding, this strand of 
literature has a few common features: technological cohort replacement is discussed 
in the setting of a ‘quality ladder’; and the advance of firms up the quality ladder
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is driven by the monopoly rent earned by patenting the next quality level. This 
chapter aims to explore technological cohort replacement from a somewhat different 
perspective.
The novel feature in what follows lies in relating technological cohort replacement 
to a radical change in R&D technology, which initiates a process of the follow- 
up innovative activities by rival firms. In this setting we develop an alternative 
explanation for the discontinuous feature often observed in quality improvements, 
and for the pattern of cohort replacement.
As in earlier chapters, we characterize an R&D technology by mapping from fixed 
outlays into product or process attributes. We saw in Chapter 4 that when radical 
change in technology induces cohort replacement, the outcome depends crucially 
on the gap between the new technology and the old. Cohort replacement does not 
necessarily take place even if the new technology is superior to the old; a (slightly) 
better new technology may be blocked by an established technology because of the 
presence of sunk costs invested in the old technology. Building upon this insight 
from Chapter 4, we consider in what follows the possibility that the established 
technology can enjoy a period of immunity vis-a-vis creative-destruction prior to the 
arrival of a strongly superior technology. The story developed here is consistent with 
the observation that technological progress may involve discrete jumps in market 
structure, which occur at well separated points in time.
As in earlier chapters, market structure and the level of R&D intensity are jointly 
determined within the model. In this setting, when a new round of quality competi­
tion is induced by the arrival of a more efficient R&D technology, a process of cohort 
replacement impacts on the equilibrium market structure and on the rate of firm 
turnover. The effects do not stop there. From a general equilibrium point of view, 
R&D spillovers induce further effects on aggregate technological progress, which in 
turn impacts upon the emergence of new R&D technologies. This chain of events 
can continue indefinitely, generating a continuing process of technological advance 
and economic growth.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. 
Section 3 characterizes the main mechanism of technological progress and economic 
growth. Section 4 analyzes the impacts of constraints on quality competition on 
market structure and growth. In Section 5 we discuss the robustness of the key 
results.
5.2 The M odel
5.2.1 The Basic Setup
Two sectors
We consider a two sector model, comprising a final good sector and an intermedi­
ate good sector, with multiple industries producing different varieties. There is a 
continuum of intermediate good industries, the number of which is normalized to 
unity. The final good can be used in consumption and can also be used as input to 
produce intermediate goods. In the final good sector there are constant returns to 
scale and perfect competition. In each industry firms compete in ‘quality’ as well as 
in price. The general framework follows that which has been introduced in Chapter 
2 .
A ggregate Level Technology and Externalities
The advance of the frontier of the aggregate technology in each period, Amax, is 
a function of R&D efforts made by all firms in all industries, measured by L2, 
and the spillover from existing knowledge stock Amax, i.e., Amax = 8L2A maiX. The 
idea of a spillover from A max to Amax is familiar within the R&D-based growth 
literature. The spillover from quality improvement by firms to aggregate advances 
in knowledge requires some comment. In this model, the R&D work force L 2 is 
hired by individual firms to improve the quality of the firms’ products. In so doing, 
they also contribute to a generic progress in knowledge. In other words, we posit
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a spillover from industry-specific innovations, i.e., quality improvements, towards 
generic aggregate technical progress. Secondly, we further assume a reverse flow 
of information, in that an advance in the economy-wide level of technical expertise 
feeds into each individual industry.
Following Aghion-Howitt (1998) it is assumed that the stochastic structure of the 
aggregate technical progress is captured by a Poisson process with arrival rate A, that 
the pace of technical progress by each aggregate innovation is 7 , that the contribu­
tions from L2 to aggregate innovations are independent so that the total arrival rate 
is L2A and the rate of aggregate technical progress is Amax/A max; =  Z/2A ln7  =  L26 , 
where 8 =  A In 7 . The application of the frontier aggregate innovation to a par­
ticular industry a is given by a random draw from a uniform distribution between 
[0,1]. The success of an application depends on that the industry’s current tech­
nology being of a vintage r  >  T; if r  < T  the probability for the occurrence of a 
drastic cohort replacement is zero. The motivation for this assumption is that, for 
a particular industry to attract the attention of the outside scientific community, it 
is necessary that an opportunity exists for the introduction of a drastically superior 
new technology. As the pace of general scientific advance is slow and gradual, a 
certain length of time must elapse before the accumulated knowledge base affords 
the possibility for this kind of advance.
M odelling Cohort Replacem ent
We model cohort replacement as a three-stage game. In the first stage, potential 
entrants simultaneously choose whether to enter the industry. In the second stage, 
those firms which have already entered the market choose their ‘quality’ levels (u*), 
which will be achieved by carrying out R&D and incurring the costs of hiring labor 
for the R&D function. In the third stage, firms’ quality levels are given, and they 
compete in quantity (Cournot competition).
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Consum ption
There are L  identical consumers who live infinitely, and each can supply one unit 
of labor per period. The labor can be supplied either as production labor used in 
final good sector, or used to do R&D. Each consumer has a discounted, linear utility 
function:
poo
j  ce~ptd t,
Jo
where c is consumption of final good, p is the discount rate. The Euler equation for 
intertemporal optimization is that r = p.
Final G ood Sector
The final good can be treated as the numeraire. Its production function is
Y  =  L\~a f  xfdi ,  (5.1)
Jo
where Y  is the total output of final good, L\  is labor input, Xi is the input of 
intermediate good i, 0  < a  <  1 .
There is perfect competition in final good market due to constant returns to 
scale, so equating the marginal product of labor to the wage rate yields the inverse 
labor demand function:
w =  -— —-— . (5.2)
Similarly equating the marginal product of input i with its price leads to the inverse 
demand function for intermediate good i,
Vi =  o i J - x T 1 =  — 7 T • (5-3)
x * f o x ? dl
5.2.2 The Game o f Quality C om petition w ith  Free Entry
In each industry experiencing cohort replacement a 3-stage game is played. As 
before, we characterize a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In the third stage,
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(‘quantity competition’) a Nash equilibrium in quantities exists and is unique, given 
the set of quality levels and the economy-wide demand conditions. The subgame 
Nash equilibrium determines for each firm a reduced form profit function, according 
to which the profit per period of firm k is
i / \ / \ 2
. . _  / T V - l  +  a V " "  /  N - l  +  a \  m
( Ef=1^  j ’
where uk is the quality level of firm k , u_k is a ( N — l)-tuple of quality levels of other 
firms except firm k , for k = 1,2, • • • , TV; AT is the number of firms in the industry 
and L\  is the amount of labor employed in the final good sector.
The derivation of this reduced form profit function is give in Appendix1 A. The 
key feature of the function is that a firm’s profit increases with its relative quality 
level vis-arvis its rivals’, i.e., Y ] ? , 2fi. Each firm incurs an R&D cost, in the form’ 7 =  l  Uj 7
of a labor cost, as a function of its quality level as follows:
/3
F ( u k;w, Ai) = wfi\  , (**)
where fi ( 1 (/? >  1 ) is the input of labor to generate quality level uk, w is
V ^ a /
the market wage rate and ^  is a constant. It is worth emphasizing that the increase 
in Ai, i.e., the aggregate level stock of knowledge, can shift the fixed cost curve 
downward as shown in Figure 5.1. The intuition here is tha t knowledge spillovers 
from aggregate technical progress enhances the efficiency of R&D by each new firm. 
This positive trend may be partially offset by the negative trend caused by an 
increase in the wage rate, also shown in Figure 5.1. The net effect is that the new 
cohort of firms have a technical advantage over old firms.
Each firm’s objective in the second stage subgame is to maximize its net profit, 
in the present value sense, by choosing its own quality level given others’ quality 
levels,
1A slight difference is that here we have replaced 7  with a .
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F =  wji l - a
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Figure 5.1: Fixed cost function
max
u k
a ^ h v  ( N - l  + a V - "  /  N - - , „
where v = / 0°° / Qr e~r3d s f  (r) dr  is the expected discounted present value of total 
revenue in a market of unit size, f  (r) is the probability density function of a cohort 
being replaced in the interval (r, r  +  dr) after taking over the market. If we take 
the reduced form profit function and the fixed cost function as given, then the game 
is in essence a game of quality competition with free entry.
5.3 Equilibrium
5.3.1 Market Structure and R&D in Each Industry
Equilibrium analysis is focused on a symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, 
where each firm equates the marginal benefit of increasing quality and the marginal 
R&D cost. The best-reply function for each firm in a symmetric outcome is defined 
implicitly by the FOC for industry i :
_ 1 (  a N  — 1 +  cA (3 (  u
s iv 7. \ t h  + 2 (n ~ 1) — ^ 5—u \ N 3 ' ' N 3 J  u \ 4 1 — a
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1 Q!
where Si = a T ^ L i  ( N~^+au) 1_a is industry z’s total revenue per period.
Now it is a feature of the model that the only industry that carries out quality 
innovation is the ‘leading edge’ industry, i.e., the industry with the highest value of 
A, i.e., A = A max. Denote the market size of this industry by Smax and its quality 
level by umax. We can now derive, from the FOC above, applied to the leading edge 
industry, the following equation:
F = ^ f e y = ^ 4 f e +2(jv- i ) ^ n ^ :) ’ ( 5 - 5 )\  -^ max /
where SmaLX = a J ^ L i  (K~^+au) 1_“ .
It is assumed that any intermediate good industry is characterized by free-entry. 
Given our assumption on the technology of intermediate good production, this re­
sults in the following zero-profit condition, which equates the fixed cost of the firm 
with the present value of profit flows,
7p (  ^ m a x  AF  =  wfi  I —rz^ r
\  -d m ax  J
NF/Sv 1
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 N
Zero-profit
Best-reply
=  (5.6)
Figure 5.2: Market structure and industry R&D intensity 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the above best-reply condition and zero-profit condition as 
two curves. The vertical axis shows the industry’s R&D intensity and the horizontal
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axis shows the number of firms in each industry. The graph shows that the best- 
reply function is upward sloping and the zero profit schedule is downward sloping, 
so there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, at which the level of R&D and 
market structure are simultaneously determined. The graph also shows that when 
the parameter (3 decreases, it shifts the best-reply function upwards and so increases 
both market concentration 1 /N  and industry R&D intensity (from a  to b). The 
intuition for this result is as follows: A lower value of (3 means a higher degree of 
increasing returns to scale at firm level. The result is a more concentrated market 
structure in each intermediate good industry. These findings are summarized in the 
following
P ro p o sitio n  23 Market structure and the R&D intensity of each intermediate good 
industry are simultaneously determined in a symmetric equilibrium. The equilibrium 
number of firms in each industry is N  =  n (/?,«) =  no+V n9~2^ 2..,„?) ? where no = 
(2+P){i—a) _j_  ^ Furthermore N  is increasing in (3.
P roof. This follows2 the proof of Proposition 1.
5.3.2 A  Balanced Growth Equilibrium
Following the conventional strategy, we examine a balanced growth equilibrium, 
where £  =  - =  4“^  = — = q and L i, Lo are constant over time. It is an immediateY  C -Amax W a a *
implication that g = 4mai =  8 L 2  = AL2 In 7 , and that and -7—  axe constantdmax Amax Amax
over time.
By eq. (5.3) the total revenue in industry i per period is
(5.7)
The demand for R&D labor per period, L2 , is,
L 2 — (1 — \ L 2 NyL (5.8)
2The slight difference is that here we have replaced 7  with a .
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where Q is the proportion of industries which have vintage younger than T, therefore 
(1  — D) is the proportion of industries which have vintage older than T, XL2 is the 
arrival rate of aggregate innovation, and N fi is the demand for innovative
labor by each industry which experiences cohort replacement. This equation implies 
that
/  u 1
(5.9)
\ A ^ r  J  ( l - f t ) A / / A T ’
which further implies that, using the subscript max to denote the leading edge 
industry, as before:
{ ■ £ ■ ) * •  <510)“ max \  ^ m a x  /
where u1 is the quality level of industry i, is the aggregate technical level when
industry i was last time at the technical frontier, and umax is the quality level of the
industry which is at the technological frontier for the time being.
Define
Oi 3  - A - ,  (5-11)
■“ m ax
which measures the relative technical level of a cohort against the frontier technical 
level. It follows that
ul l~a 
 =  a„- “  .
uT
By eq. (A.2) in Appendix A, it follows that Xi = a^-aL\  jv+a^ ) 1-a> which 
further implies that
1
Xi (  u% \  1 -0  i
 =  ( -------) = a “ i^max \  ^ max /
where x max is the output of the frontier industry.
By eq. (5.7), it follows that
x a 1 1
S m a x  =  a r - j S K -  =  o i Y — -------- =  < * Y - j —
f o X? di  di
(5.12)
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We rank a* according to the vintage r , so that
a ( t )  =  e~sl2T, (5.13)
which means that an industry of vintage r  has relative technical level e-{i2T.
The hazard rate of a cohort of vintage r  is
_  f 0 if 0 < r  <  T  / N
/  (t) =  < , (5.14)
\  L 2\e ~ L^ T- T) if t > T
which is time-invariant in balanced growth equilibrium. This implies that in bal­
anced growth equilibrium ft is constant overtime therefore
fl-^dr = (1  — ft) L 2Xdr,
where j,d r  is the proportion among those industries which are younger than T  at 
the beginning of a very short period, which are aging to older than T  during that 
period, and L 2Xdr is the proportion of those industries which are older than T  at 
the beginning of the short period, and which undergo cohort replacement during 
that period. The equation implies that at any moment the transitions between the 
immune and exposed groups of industries are balanced, and the implied steady state 
proportion of the immune group is
and consequently,
‘ - " - T T W  (516>
Substituting the above equation into eq. (5.9) results in
/  u  V  \ + l 2\ t
(5.17)
\ A  . J  An N
In a steady state, the vintage distribution is time-invariant and so the vintage 
distribution density function coincides with the Poisson probability density function
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for r  >  T.  This implies that the vintage distribution density function has the 
following form:
h ( t)  =  <
§ for 0 < t  < T
T . (5.18)
( l - f i ) L 2Ae-I'2A(,- T> for t > T
At this point we make a critical simplifying assumption, which is motivated by 
the intuition that aggregate technological progress tends to advance in slow and 
gradual manner over time. In this spirit, we assume that technological progress at 
any period is made up of an infinite number of infinitesimal jumps in Amax, and that 
the aggregate pace of progress is represented by a finite constant. Technically, this 
assumption implies that 7  —* 1 , A —> 0 0  and A In 7  =  8 (<6 > 0) .
This in turn implies that Q —> 1, i.e., almost all industries are below the vin­
tage T; once an industry reaches the vintage T, a cohort replacement immediately 
happens. Consequently, the following relations hold:
r l  r T  1 1  r T  f 1 — e~6L,2T)
Jo a i d i  =  Jo a ^ T ') f d T  =  f  J o  e ~ < L z r r f r =  s l 2 T  ’ ^5 ' 1 9 ^
r°° rT rT 1 _  p~rT
v = I / e~rsd s f  ( t)  dr = I e~TTdr  -----------  (5.20)
Jo Jo  Jo  r
and
u  V  l 2t
\ j4  ■ )
Eq. ( 5 . 1 2 )  then implies that
(5.21)
a Y  SL2T
max l _ e - 6 L 2T ' ( 5 . 2 2 )
To close the model, it remains to add the labor market clearing condition L ~
Li +  Z/2 - Given the zero-profit condition wji ^ 1“ ^  =  Smaixv^j^ , a few manipu­
lations to eq. ( 5 . 2 ) ,  ( 5 . 2 1 ) ,  ( 5 . 2 2 )  and ( 5 . 2 0 )  to eliminate w, )  , S m3LX and v 
lead to the conclusion that
( l - e - 6L*T) r N
L ‘ - \ S 0 - ^ ,  ■ p -23'
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The system reduces to four equations: <
along a balanced growth path,
r — p
^  _  ( l —e ~ gL2T ) r N  
1 aS( i - e  rT) ? which imply that 
9 = 8L2
L  — L\  +  L 2
(1 -  e~9T) pN
The properties of the implied growth rate are summarized in
P ro p o sitio n  24 For given T , the growth rate g is decreasing in the equilibrium 
number of firms in each industry, N , and it is decreasing in p.
P r o o f  -^ 2. — ________________1_____  /  f) (rivPTi d N  n tliPTii^roor. dN  Q(i- e - PT ) + e - g T N p T  u. driven d/3 u, men
dg_ _  d£_8N <  q _  
dp ~  dN dp  ^  u
The result provides some new insights about R&D based growth. The equilib­
rium market structure of each industry, represented by N , has a negative impact on 
growth rate. This does not imply, however, that growth could be enhanced by mak­
ing market structure more concentrated, since the market structure is endogenously 
determined at equilibrium. A change in market structure occurs only in response 
to a change in some parameter underlying the quality competition game, such as 
fi. For example, a  decrease in P induces a more concentrated market structure, 
and an increase in the level of R&D conducted in each industry. Through spillovers 
from industrial R&D, the whole economy benefits from the shift, in the sense that 
it enjoys a higher growth rate.
5.4 Constraints on Quality Com petition
In the last section we have demonstrated the feasibility of a growth mechanism 
which is driven by quality competition among rival firms. We might expect that 
constraints on quality competition would reduce the R&D intensity and the growth
103
rate. To check this intuition, we characterize how constraints on quality competition 
affect the results.
W ith constraints on quality, the maximization problem (5.4) becomes:
max <
Ui
a 1~aL i v  ( N  — 1 +  cA 1 “ /  N  — 1 +  (  Ui
P X PUi \ (  U '
s- t -  : I —rrr  <?7 — r ^ r )  , 0 <  7 / <  1,
A — J  \ A —
where u is the quality level in the unconstrained equilibrium for a given level of A , 
and so by eq. (5.9) (  £« )  — h°lds; 9 *s the quality constraint parameter. 
Given that 0 <  77 < 1, the quality constraints are binding and this results in the 
following comer solution to the above optimization problem:
\  ^  r  r p
Ur ' 2 ( e  o r \77——. (5.25)
U - )  » N
In the new balanced growth equilibrium, equations (5.6) - (5.24) still hold, since 
the derivation of these equations does not depend on the best-reply condition (5.5), 
which is the only condition alters in the new setting. Thus eq. (5.9) implies that
^  l2cT  (5.26)
I  ’
which in connection with eq. (5.25) leads to
L2c _  r)L2 
N c ~  N  '
Given that g = 8L2 and gc = 8L2c, eq. (5.27) implies that,
(5.27)
or alternatively,
9 c  9 9  / r
JL  =  N ’ (5'28)
9o( N , V) = 1]^ - N c(N ,V). (5.29)
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Partially differentiating the both sides of eq. (5.29) with respect to 77 results in
da (N  n) Nc (N,g)  +
dr,'' =g(JV)  TV • (5'30)
The apphcation of eq. (5.24) in this new setting implies
,»r x ,c  ( l - e ~ ^ T) p N c (N,r,)
gc (N,g) = L 6 ------------ a ( i - ’e-pT)--------- (5-31)
Partially differentiating the both sides of the above equation with respect to 77
and solving for d9c^ ' r}^  results in
dgc (N,ri) = dgc dNc (TV, g) =  p (  1 -  e~^T) d Nc (N,g)
dr) dN c dr) a  (1  — e~pT) +  e~9cTN cpT dr)
We can combine eq. (5.30) and (5.32) to solve for dNc^ ,7J^ as follows
dN c (N , 77) =  g (N) N c (TV, 77)
dr) ----- p(i - e-gcT)y------»
1 a ( l - e - P T ) + e ~ 9 c T p j cp T  ^  "  VJV /
which implies
m m < <5 3^ 4 )
dr)
Substituting eq. (5.33) into (5.32) leads to 
dgc (TV, t])   p (1 -  e~g'T) g (TV) TVC (TV, g) __________
(5.33)
dr) p (1 — e~9cT) N  + (a (1 — e~pT) +  e~9cTN cpT) g (N ) 77 ’
which implies
9gc {N,g)
dr) > 0. (5.35)
P ro p o sitio n  25 The effect of constraints on quality competition is to make market 
structure more fragmented, i.e., dNc^ ' ^  < 0 , while the rate of growth decreases, i.e.,
d9c(N,ri) q  
dr/
105
5.5 Discussion: The Immunity Period
5.5.1 Market Structure and the Duration o f Im m unity
In the two preceding sections we have assumed that the duration of the immunity 
period is fixed, independently of market structure. This assumption greatly simpli­
fies the analysis, but the question arises as to whether our main results are driven 
by this assumption. To check on this, we explore the relation between the duration 
of the immunity period T  and market structure3, measured by N .
We first consider the meaning of a ‘drastic cohort replacement’. A drastic cohort 
replacement is one in which the incumbents’ relative quality levels are so low relative 
to that of new arrivals that they make no impact on post-entry competition. This 
implies that at the time of the radical replacement, the incumbents’ mark-up ratio 
is non-positive, i.e., they make losses if they produce. According to eq. (A.l) in 
Appendix A, the mark-up ratio of a firm takes the form of
P ~ j t = L _  N - l  + a
P  I n±\  Z ^ = i  Uj
At the time of a drastic replacement, the new entrants obtain quality level umax 
while the incumbents have quality level um-m. If an incumbent deviated from the 
equilibrium strategy, by continuing production, then the number of firms in this 
market will be N  =  N  +  1 and the incumbent’s mark-up ratio would be
which implies
Recall eq. (5.10)
N + l - l  + Ct
jV^min. _|_ I ~  ’
Wmax
U% (  Ai
UT
* We are mainly interested in the case of oligopoly where N  >  3.
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which has the implication that
^max 1 ^  -^ max 1 ^ 9 , (5-37)
^max ^  -^ max ^
i.e., the growth rate of quality in the balanced growth equilibrium is g . Therefore 
at the time of drastic cohort replacement, the quality ratio between the new entrants 
and the incumbents is
^max   1-01 gT= e— g l. (5.38)
7/ •U'min
We assume tha t a drastic cohort replacement takes place immediately once in­
equality (5.36) is satisfied. It follows that we can deduce from eq. (5.38) that
e ^ T = — ^ ----- . (5.39)
TV — 1 +  a  '
The implications of eq. (5.39) include the following four equivalent equations:
TV
gT = In
N  — 1 + a
5 = ( T ^ ) T ln ] v ^ (5 '40)
N  — 1 +  a  
and
AT 1 _ a
1 _  e- ^ 5T
Combining the above equations with eq. (5.24) leads to the following three 
equations, which indicate the relations between the pairs: (TV,T), (TV, g) and (T, g) 
respectively.
a „ 41)
(1 — a ) T  TV — 1 +  a  a: (1 — e~PT)
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g = L S -
g = L 6 -
(j-G^ Y lta)pN
(1  — ck) ( l — e~gT) p 
(1  -  e~fT) ( l  -  e - A5a»T)
(5.42)
(5.43)
Characterizing these relations analytically appears to be difficult; in what follows 
we appeal to some numerical examples and graphical characterizations. We report 
one typical example below; further examples are reported in Appendix D.
E xam ple  26 Set a  =  3/5, L  =  1 ,8 = 1/5, p =  3/100, then 
, , ( - £ ) >_3_ i N  _
2 T  1X1 A T -1  ~  5 20
. ( '-fa) '*)
5 20 7 \ ------ 8-
‘“ A
N
and
a = l - ±
y  5 50 hold■
0 4 10 N>2 16 18 206 8 14
0.04'
0.03
0.01
0 4 6 8 10 ,12 16 1814 20N
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0.04-
0.03
0.01
0 2 6 8 104 T
R em ark  27 In the light of the above example, it is suggested that the possible re­
sponse of T  to the change in N  is bounded both from below and from above, and it 
decreases in N . (See the upper left panel of the above figure, where the horizontal 
dashed line is the lower bound to T . As N  increases, T  decreases but converges to a 
lower bound which is bounded away from zero); The upper right panel of the above 
figure shows that g also decreases in N , consequently as shown in the lower panel of 
the above figure, T  and g respond in the same direction when N  changes. (These 
patterns are confirmed by the more numerical examples reported in Appendix D.) 
Given that the response o fT  to the change in N  is bounded, the simplifying assump­
tion that T  is independent of N  turns out not have biased the characterization of 
the relation between N  and g qualitatively.
In Appendix D we discuss how to pin down the lower bound and an upper bound 
to T  in general, and provide some numerical examples to show that the upper bound 
and the lower bound to T  can be quite close to each other therefore the range for T  
to change is quite limited.
5.5.2 Constraints on Quality R evisited
We now return to the setting where there are constraints on quality, and extend our 
consideration of the endogeneity of the immunity period to this setting. Here, eq.
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(5.27) is modified to
L/2CT C L 2T  ( N
——  =  rj r r  • (5.44)//ATC /xJV
Given that <7C =  <5L2C and <7 =  6 L2 , the above equation translates into
^ = 7 ? ^ .  (5.45)Nc 1N  v ’
By the same token, we have from eq. (5.40),
=  (5 -46)
Combining eq. (5.40), (5.45) and eq. (5.46) to eliminate gcTc and gT , we get the
following equation which relates Nc to N  and 77,
N c NIn InN c—1 + a  ^  iV —1 + a
Nc (5-47) 
which implies that iVc is function of N  and 77, i.e., N c =  N c (N,rj). Differentiating 
both sides of the above equation with respect to 77 and solving for — leads to
dN c (N,r,) N 2C In NN - l + a
dg jy ( ... 1 -q---- 1 jn —Afc— ^ ’
iV yTVc—1 + a  ^  111 N c- l + a )
which imphes
(5.48)
S M < . .  (5.49)
or]
We may summarize the implications as follows:
1. Tightening the constraint on quality competition leads to a more fragmented 
market structure.
2. If < 0 (as is the case in the examples considered here), then
dgc(N,rj) _  dqc d N c(N,r]) ^
drj d N c dr]
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The discussion in this section provides us with some insight which partially 
justifies the simplifying assumption that the duration of immunity period can be 
treated as fixed. First, in the examples we consider, the response of the duration 
of the immunity period is very limited, because it is bounded both from above 
and below. Second, endogenizing the duration of the immunity period does not 
qualitatively change the main results obtained under the simplifying assumption.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
Creative destruction and firm turnover, in the setting of this chapter, emerge as 
outcomes of quality competition, in association with radical technological changes. 
This strengthens the claim of Chapter 2 , that quality competition constitutes a key 
vehicle in driving innovation and growth at industry level, and in combination with 
R&D spillover effects it also drives aggregate technical progress. The analysis shows 
that this mechanism is robust in the sense that it does not rely on whether aggregate 
technological progress proceeds through variety expansions a  la Romer (1990) or 
through cohort replacements a la Aghion-Howitt (1992). This study also strengthens 
another claim developed in Chapter 2: that constraints on quality consumption 
reduce R&D intensity, and lower the rate of growth.
I l l
Chapter 6
Conclusions
Before summing up the major themes that run through these chapters, it is worth 
remarking on three underlying ideas that form a point of departure for the analysis.
6.1 Three General Ideas
1. Firm -specific A ccum ulation o f Capability: (Partial) Non-rivalry and  
(Partial) Exclusion
The output of an innovation process takes the form of an increase in the stock of 
knowledge, skills or organizational capabilities of the firm. By committing resources 
to innovative activities firms can build up their capabilities, where we can interpret 
the firm’s capability by (i) a shift parameter u (‘quality’) tha t moves the firm’s 
demand schedule outwards, and/or (ii) a measure of the level of the marginal cost 
of production (‘productivity’). In the preceding chapters, the analysis has been 
conducted in terms of a mapping F  (u) that links R&D spending to quality (‘product 
innovation’) or the unit cost of production (‘process innovation’).
Despite the proprietary nature of these capabilities, there remain a number of 
channels through which ‘spillovers’ of know-how occur, and this observation under­
lies one of the basic themes developed below.
112
2. R& D C om petition  betw een Rival Firms
Much of the R&D-based growth literature relies on representation of product market 
competition which, from the perspective of the industrial organization literature, 
appear rather special. The monopolistic competition framework excludes the kind 
of R&D escalation mechanism discussed in the foregoing chapters, while the ladder 
model of quality competition implies that each market as monopolized at each point 
in time. The framework used in the forgoing chapters allows us to examine the race 
of R&D competition, while permitting a realistic representation of market structure.
3. Increasing Returns to  Scale
The use of the term ‘increasing returns’ has led to some confusion in the recent 
literature, in that different authors use the term to mean different things. It is 
worth distinguishing a number of uses, relating to the analysis of the preceding 
chapters:
(i) Technical ‘increasing returns’. This relates to the shape of the F  (u) function. 
In the present thesis, this displays diminishing returns.
(ii) A second sense in which the item is used relates to the shape of the firm’s 
average cost schedule. Since we assume fixed outlays in combination with a  flat 
marginal cost schedule, the present analysis assumes increasing returns in this sense.
(iii) A third sense relates to the mapping from fixed outlays F  to profit n. In the 
above chapters, the relation between profit and R&D inputs is ‘S’ shaped. In other 
words, increasing returns in this sense can hold over a certain limited range in the 
setting that features constant returns to scale in production, together with an R&D 
technology which displays decreasing technical returns in the sense of (i) above.
The degree of increasing returns to scale has a significance on market structure, 
and on resource allocation as has been demonstrated in all four previous chapters.
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6.2 Three Major Themes
The central aim of the thesis has been to show how market structure shapes, and 
changes in line with the evolution of technology. This has been done by developing 
a class of quality competition models, within which three basic themes have been 
developed.
(a) Q uality Com petition: The Joint D eterm ination  o f R& D Intensity and  
Market Structure
The first major theme relates to the joint determination of R&D intensity and market 
structure in the context of quality competition; the models developed in Chapters 
2-5 all display this feature. This places in the forefront of the analysis the role 
of a  general economic mechanism, the “escalation mechanism” (Sutton, 1998), in 
shaping equilibrium outcomes. The aim of this thesis has been to fit this economic 
mechanism into some broader frameworks and to explore its implications.
In Chapters 2 and 5, we show how the escalation mechanism can be incorporated 
into a general equilibrium framework, so that market structure, R&D intensity and 
the rate of economic growth all emerge as endogenous variables. In Chapter 3, we 
show how the escalation mechanism can be related to the process of shakeout of firms 
during a typical industry life cycle. In Chapter 4, we show how a radical change in 
the technology of R&D may affect the interaction between quality competition and 
market structure.
(b) Creative D estruction and th e B irth  o f N ew  Industries
While Chapter 2  captures the mechanisms associated with the birth and growth of 
new industries, Chapter 5 is concerned with the complementary process of ‘creative 
destruction’. Taken together, these chapters paint a picture of the economic growth 
process which features a continuous turnover in the population of industries.
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The mechanisms driving this process rest upon the process of spillovers of knowl­
edge, and so on the limits to the proprietary nature of capabilities mentioned earlier. 
W hat is novel to the present literature is that these spillovers are modelled as occur­
ring across industries, as opposed to over time, as in the existing growth literature.
(c) Financial Institutions and M arket Environm ents
We have shown in Chapter 2, 3 and 5, that whether quality competition and the 
escalation mechanism can be effective in driving the process of innovation and growth 
depends on whether the institutional factors are present which support investments 
in quality building. If the only source of finance lies in retained earnings, then the 
uptake of profitable innovation opportunities may be constrained.
The analysis of Chapter 2 and 5 elaborates on the ways in which the absence 
of well functioning financial markets will impinge in damaging ways on the growth 
process.
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A ppendix A
For Chapter 2
D erivation o f the reduced form profit function
To ease notation, the subscript which identifies industries is dropped. Then the 
inverse demand function (2.3) faced by a representative industry becomes
p = 1L \ ^ x ^ ~ \
where x  is the industry’s output, x = YljLi the output of firm j  and N  is
the number of firms. It can rewritten as
( _l \  !-77 1-7 Li
 J
Consider the Cournot competition in quantity: for given (rr-7), j  ^  z, firm i 
chooses x % to maximize its profit:
max
where — is the cost of producing one unit of quality-adjusted quantity. Ui is the
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‘quality’ (or productivity) index. The FOC of the problem is,
i ^ y - 7  , ^  x l _7
52j=ixJ)  i (  7 1-7Li \  1
Ui
(  1^7 \ 1_7Substituting f L\ J with p and solving for x l, gives the following equation:
( p - i ) xx' = ( 1 - 7 )p ' 
The market share of firm i is then
x i 1 P - - ~
x  1 — 7  p
Summing up the market shares of all firms to eliminate x l and x: 
S i l i  ~  =  1 =  P p^i=1 an<^  solving for p leads to
1
-^—7=1 UjP -
N  — 1 +  7
By the above equations the market share of firm i can be solved as 
x1   1 [  1 N —1+7 \
The mark-up ratio of firm i is 
The industry output in equilibrium then is
( TV — 1 +  7  ^ 1-7
y-\JV 1
1 Ui
x  =  7 1- ,  £ ,  [ ^  t ) . (A.2)
The total revenue of the industry turns out to be
i /AT - 1  +  7 X i - 7 
S  = px = 7 1-t,Li I „ x  
S ?= i uj
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Finally, the reduced form profit function is derived as
( N  -  1 +  7 V ~7 /  N - l  + i \
- I .  i . \ _  o  1 ( ,  N ~ ' L + ' r \ ( - l JV- 1  +  7 
( ’ I “ -*) 1 -  7  ( *pN m. j ( m.
market size \  2- ^ j = \  Uj J  \  Z - /j= 1 Uj
market share mark-up ratio
P roof o f Proposition 1
By the best reply condition eq. (2.5) and the zero profit condition eq. (2.6), the 
following quadratic equation of N f  can be derived:
2
the largest positive solution of which is
N , - n  ( 0 , - , ) »  5 £ ± v 3 E M E 3
where no =  (2+/3^ 1~7) +  1 . It is easy to see that
dN f d N f dn0
~ W  = ~ d ^ ~ d ^ > '
P roof o f Proposition 3
By Proposition 1 , N f  = no+V n° 2(2 j d  ^ where nQ = (2+ ^ ) (1 i) _j_ \
2
Then the following goes through:
N f  > 1 =>• ^njj — 2 (2 — 7) > 2  — n0
ng — 2  ( 2  — 7) > (2  — no) 2 if no <  2  
n§ — 2  (2  — 7) > 0  if no >  2
n0 > (2  -  7) +  ±7 if n0 < 2  
no >  2  otherwise
n0 > (2 — 7) +  ^7 > 2 — 7.
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Then the following comparative statics can be derived:
a(MI(/?,7,A0) —2 (Afn0 — ( 2  — 7 )) —2  ((iV — 1 ) (2  — 7)) J
   =    < ------------ 77775  < U andd N  @N3 j3N3
d (N F 0) 2 (AT- 1 )  ( 2 - 7 )
d N  0 N 3
P roof o f  Lem m a 4
Given <7 =
> 0 when N  > 1.
2  =   ? p r6T jv
a^v_n_£,_o
Note that if TV > TV* and g > 0, then ^  and if g = x~7g^ —  > 0, then
(I- 7 )(i - 0)'£  >  P- Consequently, 
JOa. — JL (
d N  d N  \ iVe+7
_  _a_ /  76L  (1—7 )/31V—7 —2(1V—1)(1V—1+ 7 ) _  y \  1 | a /  1 A (  'jSLNYl _ n\  NT
~  d N  y  (1—7 ) (1—0) p N  P i y  J  IVe+7  “r dlV \N e+ ~ f J  \ ^ ( l - 7 ) ( l - 0) P )  i y
= - ( 7 ^ (g (2r - f c  + p) v b i  ~  W F y ? ( o ^ S )  - ^ ) w <°- 
(+ ) <+> 'ySN Fql  j
Also note that if N  < N* and g > 0, then ^  <  ^ 5 ; and if g = 1-7  ^ —  > 0, then 
> P- Consequently,
9<L =  j l [  2l ^ $ L~ pN
d N  d N  I iVe+7
_d_ (  7S L _ j y 2p  0 } A  — 1 ' j /SL N F p-py y _d_ (
d N  y  (1—7)0 r °  P i y  J  N e + 7  ( 1 - 7 ) 0  J V d l V ^  IVe+7 ,/
=  (  16L d  ( 7+ 2(lV—1)(1V—1+ 7 ) S _  \  _ 1  /y6L N F o —p y  a  /  1 ^
1 (1- 7)0 9 / ^ ^  P N  J  P J  N e + 7  (1 ~ 7 )0  01V ^ IVe+ 7  y
  /  ry6L  21V2+ 7 —2   \  1 ■ jSL N F p —p t\ t e
~  I (1- 7)0 /31V2 P J  IVe+7  ( 1 - 7 ) 0  iV (N e + 7 )a
<" | 7^  21V2+ 7 —2   'ySLNFp \  1 . 'ySLNFp—p y  e
^  I (1- 7)0 /31V2 (1- 7)0 y  IVe+7  ( l - 7 )0 JV (IVe+7)2
_  /  76L 21V2+ 7 —2 _  76L 7+ 2(lV—1)(1V—1+ 7 ) \  1 , ■ySLNFp-p at e
^ (1 -7 )0  /31V2 (1 - 7 ) 0  P N 2 )  IVe+7  ^  (1 - 7 ) 0  (IVe+7)2
_  7<?L 2(2—7 )(1V—1) 1 ' jSLNFp—p y  e ^  n
(1- 7)0 /31V2 IVe+7  (1- 7)0 iV (lVe+ 7 )2
(+) (+)
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A ppendix B
For C hapter 3
Derivation o f the R educed Form Profit Function
The subscript can be removed when a representative submarket in an arbitrary pe­
riod after its emergence is addressed. So the demand function in eq. (3.2) becomes:
* - » ( ? ) * •
.where1 X  is the submarket’s output, X  = X^=i x*i x* 1S the output of producer j  
and N  is the number of producers. It can be rewritten as
1 - 7
Consider the Cournot Competition in quantity: for given vector (z3), j  ±  i, 
producer i chooses x% to maximize her profit:
1 - 7
max E n
3=1 X 3
where ^  is the cost of producing one unit of effective quantity. Ui is the ‘quality’
1If X  is interpreted as effective quantity, then this demand function can be applied to both
homogeneous good or vertically differentiated good.
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(or productivity) index. The FOC of the program is:
/  \  1—7
1 - 7< . ( s \ i_
Ui
Substituting I = + —- ) with p and solving for x ' gives the following equation:
( 1 - 7 ) p  ■
The submarket share of producer i then is
l p -  h
X  1 — 7  p
Summing up the submarket shares of all producers to eliminate x % and X: 1 =  
x  = 1 ^ 7  ~ and solving for p  leads to
3 = 1  U ip = N  — 1 +  7
By the above equations the submarket share of producer i can be solved as
x l __ 1 ( 1  _  iV—1 + 7  1
The mark-up ratio of producer i is v—^- =  M — ■^ 1+JL J
p \  1 Uj J
The submarket total output in equilibrium then is
1
^■=1 Uj )
The total revenue of the submarket turns out to be
1-7
E SSj= 1 Uj
Finally the reduced form profit function of producer i is derived as
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N  — 1 +  7IV- 1 + 7
5 . N -  1 +  7 ' 7 i V - l  +  7 iv — 1 +  7
total sales
\N  
'j
submarket share of producer i mark-up ratio of producer i
P roof o f Proposition 12
By eq. (3.8) and eq. (3.9) the following quadratic equation can be derived: AT| — 
n0A^ 2 +  = 0 , the largest positive solution of which is N2 = no+V n°~2^ - j l  ^ is
not difficult to verify that 7 ^  < 0 .
P roof o f Proposition 13
Combining eq. (3.10) and eq. (3.11) leads to the following equation:
^ 1  — 7 7 ^  0 0 ^ )  =  TakinS log^ithm  transformation of both
sides of the above equation and manipulating it can lead to:
ln (5 , ( l - 7 ) ) - I^ ^ l n / i - 2 1 nA^1+ I^ l n ^ l - ^ )  =  ( l -  Differentiat­
ing both sides w.r.t. 8 and reorganizing the equation reveals the following derivative:
7 ^  =  1~72^ 2+^1 1+7)- lt  is easy t 0  see that W  < 0  when ^
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A ppendix C
For Chapter 4
The Second Order Condition
Here we check on the related second order condition:
d2Y
d k2 =  2  S  
= 2  S
AT4
[(iWV +  l ) 4 
JV4 
(kN  + l ) 4 
S
k2 (kN  +  l ) 4
v k N  + l J
2 N 3
1 -
 (kN  + l f .  
N  \  2 N 3
k N  + l J  (kN  + i y .
0 (0 - 1)
k2
0 (0 - 1)
k 2
(fl'ku)^
s (  1- Nk N + l
[2N*k2 (2k N  +  2 — SN) + / ? ( / ? —!) (kN  +  1 — iV) 2 (fcTV +  l ) 2]
Figure C .l shows that < 0 for (3 >  1 , which confirms that the sufficient 
condition for maximization is satisfied.
Possible R esponse by the Incum bents
If the incumbents are allowed to respond after they observe the new entry and the 
entrant’s quality level ku , a fourth stage should be added to the game as follows:
• Stage 4 : After observing the new entrant’s quality level, the incumbents si­
multaneously choose to adjust their quality levels.
We want to know if this makes the outcome different from the case where the 
incumbents are not allowed to change their quality levels. If this does change the
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-0.4
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Figure C.l:
outcome, then we must be able to see an incumbent wants to deviate from the 
outcome of that case. Given other players’ strategies the same as in the equilibrium 
in that case, any incumbent’s payoff function is
2
y (kiu  | (u ) , ku ) =  5 ( 1  —
N
{kiu)p +  (u)13, hi > 1 .
h  (TV -  1) +  ^  +  1 
The marginal payoff of increasing ki a t the point k\ =  1 is 
d
dki
d
dki
= 25 1 ( 1 -
y (k\u  | (u),  ku)
,(x-
fc l= l
N
h  ( N - l) +  ^  +  l
fc l= l
N N
1 , 9 . N  -  1 +  f  ) -  p t f
N  + V { N  + \ f \
Combining eq. (4.2) and (C.l) to eliminate (3uP results in 
d
dki
= 25 I I I -
y (k\u  | (u ) , ku) 
N  \
fcx=l
N
A N ~ 1 + k
N 2 — 2N + 1  
N 3
=  25/09)
(C.l)
124
p-0.005
- 0.01
-0.015
- 0.02
-0.025
Figure C.2 : /  (j3)
where /  (/?) =  ( l  — j f o )  ^  {N  _  i  +  i )  _
Figure C.2 shows that /  {(3) < 0  for /? >  | ,  which implies that
d
N=n((3),k=K(n(f3),(3)
■y (k\u  | ( u ) , fcu) < 0,
fci=id k i
i.e., increasing quality is not an optimal response by any incumbent. Given that 
the incumbents’ R&D costs have been sunk, they can not be saved by decreasing 
quality, i.e., the constraint k\ > 1 must be satisfied, the optimal solution is the 
corner solution k\ =  1 , i.e., no response in quality.
R em ark  28 In the basic model, when (3 > | ,  even i f  the incumbents are allowed to 
respond to the entrant’s quality choice, the equilibrium outcome is exactly the same 
as i f  the incumbents were not allowed to respond.
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A ppendix D
For Chapter 5
M ore N um erical Exam ples
Exam ple 29 Set L = l ,a  = 2/5, p = 3/100, then
/
I _  1 N9 = 6 - 4 ,
3/ I  N
 # - 3—v hold.
0.04
0.03
0.§2
0.01
0.25
0.2 \  
del%.15
ddhl s
’^ • « T o  9
Exam ple 30 Set L = l ,a  = 3/5, p =  3/100, then
\
9 = s ~  jo I J-
J
N— A
1 i N  ^ 200g
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Exam ple 31 Set L = 1 , a = 2 /5 ,8 =  1/5, then
0.03
0.025'
0 .02-
00*5
o.or
0.005'
Exam ple 32 Set L = 1, a = 3 /5 ,8 =  1/5, £/ien
/ \
i -
/
iV
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2 T N-i
\
/K>)
P l - e - p T  hold.
0 3
T he Bounds to  th e  D u ra tio n  of th e  Im m unity
T he Lower B ound
  , , _  =  lim I L8
N —>oo ( 1  — O i ) T  N  — 1 +  a  N —>oo
(y -  ( w ^ r A )  p n
a  (1 — e~pT)
( 1 - { 7 T ^ y ' Za) p N \
k S L  I a  (1 -  e~pT) ~  — 1
LSepT - L b  
e',T — 1 =  0
infT =
N
ln ( z & ) (D.l)
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A n  U p p er B o u n d  We consider the oligopoly case where N  > 3. Therefore 
substituting N  =  3 into eq. (5.41) gives us following equation which determines the 
upper bound to T,
3 1 - 2 + a 
which also implies
a  (1 —  e~PT )
= L 6 -
a  3
In
(1 - a ) T  2 + a
T  =
— ——  I n  — - —(1—a ) 2 + a
1 /_LS_\
Since T  >  infn T  = —■■—■ ,  the following inequahty holds,
(D.2)
(D.3)
(1  — a) 2 + a 2 + a
>"(*)
a  (1 — e~PT )
which further implies that there exists an upper bound to T  such that
In
\
T <
Overall, the following holds
In
(l-«)
< T  <
P P
To get an idea of how close these two bounds can be, we look at the ratio of the 
upper bound to the lower bound:
I
In
( i - “ ) TT-
\
R = l+T»=SfcM*-(* r*)v
to( A )
and go through a few numerical examples.
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Exam ple 33 Set L =  l , a  =  2/5, then
In §6~ip\ o ln2  ----
 3^1-  ^^5( ^4)
R =   /  e ----------------- holds.
111 e - p
E xam ple 34 Set L = l , a  =  3/5, i/ien 
= ------------- S - s ----------------
S - p
1-I80O6
R em ark  35 77ie above numerical examples show that the upper bound and the lower 
bound to T  can be quite close to each other therefore the range for T  to change is 
quite limited.
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